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Abstract
This paper presents an approach to verify safety properties of
Erlang-style, higher-order concurrent programs automatically. In-
spired by Core Erlang, we introduce λACTOR, a prototypical func-
tional language with pattern-matching algebraic data types, aug-
mented with process creation and asynchronous message-passing
primitives. We formalise an abstract model of λACTOR programs
called Actor Communicating System (ACS) which has a natural
interpretation as a vector addition system, for which some verifi-
cation problems are decidable. We give a parametric abstract inter-
pretation framework for λACTOR and use it to build a polytime com-
putable, flow-based, abstract semantics of λACTOR programs, which
we then use to bootstrap the ACS construction, thus deriving a more
accurate abstract model of the input program. We have constructed
Soter, a tool implementation of the verification method, thereby
obtaining the first fully-automatic, infinite-state model checker for
a core fragment of Erlang. We find that in practice our abstrac-
tion technique is accurate enough to verify an interesting range
of safety properties. Though the ACS coverability problem is EX-
PSPACE-complete, Soter can analyse these verification problems
surprisingly efficiently.
Keywords Verification, Infinite-State Model Checking, Static
Analysis, Petri Nets, Erlang
1. Introduction
This paper concerns the verification of concurrent programs written
in Erlang. Originally designed to program fault-tolerant distributed
systems at Ericsson in the late 80s, Erlang is now a widely used,
open-sourced language with support for higher-order functions,
concurrency, communication, distribution, on-the-fly code reload-
ing, and multiple platforms [2, 3]. Largely because of a runtime
system that offers highly efficient process creation and message-
passing communication, Erlang is a natural fit for programming
multicore CPUs, networked servers, parallel databases, GUIs, and
monitoring, control and testing tools.
The sequential part of Erlang is a higher order, dynamically
typed, call-by-value functional language with pattern-matching al-
gebraic data types. Following the actor model [1], a concurrent Er-
lang computation consists of a dynamic network of processes that
communicate by message passing. Every process has a unique pro-
cess identifier (pid), and is equipped with an unbounded mailbox.
Messages are sent asynchronously in the sense that send is non-
blocking. Messages are retrieved from the mailbox, not FIFO, but
First-In-First-Firable-Out (FIFFO) via pattern-matching. A process
may block while waiting for a message that matches a certain pat-
tern to arrive in its mailbox. For a quick and highly readable intro-
duction to Erlang, see Armstrong’s CACM article [2].
Challenges. Concurrent programs are hard to write. They are just
as hard to verify. In the case of Erlang programs, the inherent
complexity of the verification task can be seen from several diverse
sources of infinity in the state space.
(∞ 1) General recursion requires a (process local) call-stack.
(∞ 2) Higher-order functions are first-class values; closures can
be passed as parameters or returned.
(∞ 3) Data domains, and hence the message space, are un-
bounded: functions may return, and variables may be
bound to, terms of an arbitrary size.
(∞ 4) An unbounded number of processes can be spawned dy-
namically.
(∞ 5) Mailboxes have unbounded capacity.
The challenge of verifying Erlang programs is that one must reason
about the asynchronous communication of an unbounded set of
messages, across an unbounded set of Turing-powerful processes.
Our goal is to verify safety properties of Erlang-like programs
automatically, using a combination of static analysis and infinite-
state model checking. To a large extent, the key decision of which
causes of infinity to model as accurately as possible and which
to abstract is forced upon us: the class consisting of a fixed set
of context-free (equivalently, first-order) processes, each equipped
with a mailbox of size one and communicating messages from a
finite set, is already Turing powerful [10]. Our strategy is thus to
abstract (∞ 1), (∞ 2) and (∞ 3), while seeking to analyse message-
passing concurrency, assuming (∞ 4) and (∞ 5).
We consider programs of λACTOR , a prototypical functional lan-
guage with actor-style concurrency. λACTOR is essentially Core Er-
lang [5]—the official intermediate representation of Erlang code,
which exhibits in full the higher-order features of Erlang, with
asynchronous message-passing concurrency and dynamic process
creation.
With decidable infinite-state model checking in mind, we intro-
duce Actor Communicating System (ACS), which models the inter-
action of an unbounded set of communicating processes. An ACS
has a finite set of control states Q, a finite set of pid classes P , a fi-
nite set of messages M , and a finite set of transition rules. An ACS
transition rule has the shape ι : q ℓ−→ q′, which means that a process
of pid class ι can transition from state q to state q′ with (possible)
communication side effect ℓ, of which there are four kinds, namely,
(i) the process makes an internal transition (ii) it extracts and reads
a message m from its mailbox (iii) it sends a message m to a pro-
cess of pid class ι′ (iv) it spawns a process of pid class ι′. ACS
models are infinite state: the mailbox of a process has unbounded
capacity, and the number of processes in an ACS may grow arbi-
trarily large. However the set of pid classes is fixed, and processes
of the same pid class are not distinguishable.
An ACS can be interpreted naturally as a vector addition sys-
tem (VAS), or equivalently Petri net, using counter abstraction.
Recall that a VAS of dimension n is given by a set of n-long
vectors of integers regarded as transition rules. A VAS defines a
state transition graph whose states are just n-long vectors of non-
negative integers. There is a transition from state v to state v′ just if
v
′ = v+r for some transition rule r. It is well-known that the deci-
sion problems Coverability and LTL Model Checking for VAS are
EXPSPACE-complete; Reachability is decidable but its complex-
ity is open. We consider a particular counter abstraction of ACS,
called VAS semantics, which models an ACS as a VAS of dimen-
sion |P | × (|Q| + |M |), distinguishing two kinds of counters. A
counter named by a pair (ι, q) counts the number of processes of
pid class ι that are currently in state q; a counter named by (ι,m)
counts the sum total of occurrences of a message m currently in
the mailbox of p, where p ranges over processes of pid class ι. Us-
ing this abstraction, we can conservatively decide properties of the
ACS using well-known decision procedures for VAS.
Parametric, Flow-based Abstract Interpretation. The starting
point of our verification pathway is the abstraction of the sources of
infinity (∞ 1), (∞ 2) and (∞ 3). Methods such as k-CFA [32] can
be used to abstract higher-order recursive functions to a finite-state
system. Rather than ‘baking in’ each type of abstraction separately,
we develop a general abstract interpretation framework which is
parametric on a number of basic domains. In the style of Van Horn
and Might [33], we devise a machine-based operational semantics
of λACTOR that uses store-allocated continuations. The advantage
of such an indirection is that it enables the construction of a ma-
chine semantics which is ‘generated’ from the basic domains of
Time, Mailbox and Data . We show that there is a simple no-
tion of sound abstraction of the basic domains whereby every such
abstraction gives rise to a sound abstract semantics of λACTOR pro-
grams (Theorem 1). Further if a given sound abstraction of the
basic domains is finite and the associated auxiliary operations are
computable, then the derived abstract semantics is finite and com-
putable.
Generating an Actor Communicating System. We study the ab-
stract semantics derived from a particular 0-CFA-like abstraction
of the basic domains. However we do not use it to verify properties
of λACTOR programs directly, as it is too coarse an abstraction to be
useful. Rather, we show that a sound ACS (Theorem 3) can be con-
structed in polynomial time by bootstrapping from the 0-CFA-like
abstract semantics. Further, the dimension of the resulting ACS is
polynomial in the length of the input λACTOR program. The idea
is that the 0-CFA-like abstract (transition) semantics constitutes a
sound but rough analysis of the control-flow of the program, which
takes higher-order computation into account but communicating
behaviour only minimally. The bootstrap construction consists in
constraining these rough transitions with guards of the form ‘re-
ceive a message of this type’ or ‘send a message of this type’ or
‘spawn a process’, thus resulting in a more accurate abstract model
of the input λACTOR program in the form of an ACS.
Evaluation. To demonstrate the feasibility of our verification
method, we have constructed a prototype implementation called
Soter. Our empirical results show that the abstraction framework is
accurate enough to verify an interesting range of safety properties
of non-trivial Erlang programs.
Outline. In Section 2 we define the syntax of λACTOR and infor-
mally explain its semantics with the help of an example program. In
Section 3, we introduce Actor Communicating System and its VAS
semantics. In Section 4 we present a machine-based operational se-
mantics of λACTOR. In Section 5 we develop a general abstract inter-
pretation framework for λACTOR programs, parametric on a number
of basic domains. In Section 6, we use a particular instantiation
of the abstract interpretation to bootstrap the ACS construction. In
Section 7 we present the experimental results based on our tool im-
plementation Soter, and discuss the limitations of our approach.
Notation. We write A∗ for the set of finite sequences of elements
of the set A, and ǫ for the null sequence. Let a ∈ A and l, l′ ∈
A∗, we overload ‘·’ so that it means insertion at the top a · l, at
the bottom l · a or concatenation l · l′. We write li for the i-th
element of l. The set of finite partial functions from A to B is
denoted A ⇀ B. Given f : A ⇀ B we define f [a 7→ b] :=
(λx. if (x = a) then b else f(x)) and write [] for the everywhere
undefined function.
2. A Prototypical Fragment of Erlang
In this section we introduce λACTOR , a prototypical untyped func-
tional language with actor concurrency. λACTOR is essentially
single-node Core Erlang [5]—the official intermediate represen-
tation of Erlang code—without built-in functions and fault-tolerant
features. It exhibits in full the higher-order features of Erlang, with
message-passing concurrency and dynamic process creation.
Syntax The syntax of λACTOR is defined as follows:
e ∈ Exp ::= x | c(e1, . . . , en) | e0(e1, . . . , en) | fun
| letrec x1=fun1. · · ·xn=funn. in e
| case e of pat1 → e1; . . . ; patn → en end
| receive pat1 → e1; . . . ; patn → en end
| send(e1, e2) | spawn(e) | self ()
fun ::= fun(x1, . . . , xn) → e
pat ::= x | c(pat1, . . . , patn)
where c ranges over a finite set Σ of constructors which we
consider fixed thorough out the paper.
For ease of comparison we keep the syntax close to Core Erlang
and use uncurried functions, delimiters, fun and end. We write ‘ ’
for an unnamed unbound variable; using symbols from Σ, we
write n-tuples as {e1, . . . , en}, the list constructors as cons [ | ]
and the empty list as [] . Sequencing (e1 , e2) is a shorthand for
(fun( )→e2)(e1) and we we omit brackets for nullary constructors.
The character ‘%’ marks the start of a line of comment. Variable
names begin with an uppercase letter, except when bound by letrec .
The free variables fv(e) of an expression are defined as usual. A
λACTOR program P is just a closed λACTOR expression.
Labels For ease of reference to program points, we associate a
unique label to each sub-expression of a program. We write ℓ : e to
mean that ℓ is the label associated with e, and we often omit the
label altogether. Take a term ℓ : (ℓ0 : e0(ℓ1 : e1, . . . , ℓn : en)), we
define ℓ.argi := ℓi and arity(ℓ) := n.
Semantics The semantics of λACTOR is defined in Section 4, but
we informally present a small-step reduction semantics here to give
an intuition of its model of concurrency. The rewrite rules for the
cases of function application and λ-abstraction are the standard
ones for call-by-value λ-calculus; we write evaluation contexts as
E[ ].
A state of the computation of a λACTOR program is a set Π of
processes running in parallel. A process 〈e〉ι
m
, identified by the pid
ι, evaluates an expression e with mailbox m holding the messages
not yet consumed. Purely functional reductions with no side-effect
take place in each process, independently interleaved. A spawn
construct, spawn(fun()→e), evaluates to a fresh pid ι′ (say), with
the side-effect of the creation of a new process, 〈e〉ι
′
ǫ , with pid ι′:
〈E[spawn(fun()→e)]〉ι
m
‖ Π −→ 〈E[ι′]〉ι
m
‖ 〈e〉ι
′
ǫ ‖ Π
A send construct, send(ι, v), evaluates to the message v with the
side-effect of appending it to the mailbox of the receiver process ι;
thus send is non-blocking:
〈E[send(ι, v)]〉ι
′
m
′ ‖ 〈e〉ι
m
‖ Π −→ 〈E[v]〉ι
′
m
′ ‖ 〈e〉ι
m·v ‖ Π
The evaluation of a receive construct, receive p1 → e1 . . . pn →
en end, will block if the mailbox of the process in question contains
no message that matches any of the patterns pi. Otherwise, the
first message m that matches a pattern, say pi, is consumed by
the process, and the computation continues with the evaluation
of ei. The pattern-matching variables in ei are bound by θ to the
corresponding matching subterms of the message m; if more than
one pattern matches the message, then (only) the first in textual
order is fired.
〈E[receive p1 → e1 . . . pn → en end]〉ιm·m·m′ ‖ Π
−→ 〈E[θei]〉
ι′
m·m′ ‖ Π;
Note that message passing is not First-In-First-Out but rather
First-In-First-Fireable Out (FIFFO): incoming messages are queued
at the end of the mailbox but the message that matches a receive
construct, and is subsequently extracted, is not necessarily the first
in the queue.
Example 1 (Locked Resource). Figure 1 shows an example
λACTOR program. The code has three logical parts, which would
constitute three modules in Erlang. The first part defines an Erlang
behaviour1 that governs the lock-controlled, concurrent access of
a shared resource by a number of clients. A resource is viewed
as a function implementing a protocol that reacts to requests; the
function is called only when the lock is acquired. Note the use of
higher-order arguments and return values. The function res start
creates a new process that runs an unlocked ( res free ) instance
of the resource. When unlocked, a resource waits for a {lock , P}
message to arrive from a client P. Upon receipt of such a mes-
sage, an acknowledgement message is sent back to the client and
the control is yielded to res locked . When locked (by a client P),
a resource can accept requests {req,P,Cmd} from P—and from P
only—for an unspecified command Cmd to be executed.
After running the requested command, the resource is expected
to return the updated resource handler and an answer, which may
be the atom ok, which requires no additional action, or a couple
{reply , Ans} which signals that the answer Ans should be sent
back to the client. When an unlock message is received from P
the control is given back to res free . Note that the mailbox match-
ing mechanism allows multiple locks and requests to be sent asyn-
chronously to the mailbox of the locked resource without causing
conflicts: the pattern matching in the locked state ensures that all
the pending lock requests get delayed for later consumption once
the resource gets unlocked. The functions res lock , res unlock ,
res request , res do encapsulate the locking protocol, hiding it from
the user who can then use this API as if it was purely functional.
The second part implements a simple ‘shared memory cell’
resource that holds a natural number, which is encoded using the
constructors zero and {succ, }, and allows a client to read its value
(the command read) or overwrite it with a new one (the {write , X}
command). Without locks, a shared resource with such a protocol
easily leads to race conditions.
The last part defines the function inc which accesses a locked
cell to increment its value. The function add to cell adds M to
the contents of the cell by spawning M processes incrementing
it concurrently. Finally the entry-point of the program sets up a
process with a shared locked cell and then calls add to cell . Note
that N is a free variable; to make the example a program we can
either close it by setting N to a constant or make it range over all
natural numbers with the extension described in Section 5.
1 I.e. a module implementing a general purpose protocol, parametrised over
another module containing the code specific to a particular instance.
1 letrec
2 %%% LOCKED RESOURCE MODULE
3 res start = fun(Res)→ spawn(fun()→ res free (Res)).
4 res free = fun(Res)→
5 receive {lock, P}→
6 send(P, {acquired, self ()}), res locked (Res, P)
7 end.
8 res locked = fun(Res, P)→
9 receive
10 {req, P, Cmd}→
11 case Res(P, Cmd) of
12 {NewRes, ok}→
13 res locked (NewRes, P);
14 {NewRes, {reply, A}}→
15 send(P, {ans, self () , A}),
16 res locked (NewRes, P)
17 end;
18 {unlock, P}→ res free (Res)
19 end.
20
21 % Locked Resource API
22 res lock = fun(Q)→ send(Q, {lock, self ()}),
23 receive {acquired, Q}→ ok end.
24 res unlock = fun(Q)→ send(Q, {unlock, self ()}).
25 res request = fun(Q, Cmd)→
26 send(Q, {req, self () , Cmd}),
27 receive {ans, Q, X}→ X end.
28 res do= fun(Q, Cmd)→send(Q, {req, self () , Cmd}).
29
30 %%% CELL IMPLEMENTATION MODULE
31 cell start = fun()→ res start (cell (zero)).
32 cell = fun(X)→
33 fun( P, Cmd)→
34 case Cmd of
35 {write , Y}→ {cell (Y), ok};
36 read → {cell (X), {reply , X}}
37 end.
38
39 % Cell API
40 cell lock = fun(C)→ res lock (C).
41 cell unlock = fun(C)→ res unlock (C).
42 cell read = fun(C)→ res request (C, read).
43 cell write = fun(C, X)→ res do (C, {write , X}).
44
45 %%% INCREMENT CLIENT
46 inc = fun(C)→ cell lock (C),
47 cell write (C, {succ, cell read (C)}),
48 cell unlock (C).
49 add to cell = fun(M, C)→
50 case M of zero → ok;
51 {succ, M’} → spawn(fun()→ inc (C)),
52 add to cell (M’, C)
53 end.
54 %%% ENTRY POINT
55 in C = cell start () , add to cell (N, C).
Figure 1. Locked Resource (running example)
An interesting correctness property of this code is the mutual
exclusion of the lock-protected region (i.e. line 47) of the concur-
rent instances of inc .
Remark 1. The following Core Erlang features are not captured by
λACTOR. (i) Module system, exception handling, arithmetic primi-
tives, built-in data types and I/O can be straightforwardly translated
or integrated into our framework. They are not treated here be-
cause they are tied to the inner workings of the Erlang runtime sys-
tem. (ii) Timeouts in receives, registered processes and type guards
can be supported using suitable abstractions. (iii) A proper treat-
ment of monitor / link primitives and the multi-node semantics will
require a major extension of the concrete (and abstract) semantics.
3. Actor Communicating Systems
In this section we explore the design space of abstract models of
Erlang-style concurrency. We seek a model of computation that
should capture the core concurrency and asynchronous communi-
cation features of λACTOR and yet enjoys the decidability of interest-
ing verification problems. In the presence of pattern-matching alge-
braic data types, the (sequential) functional fragment of λACTOR is
already Turing powerful [28]. Restricting it to a pushdown (equiv-
alently, first-order) fragment but allowing concurrent execution
would enable, using very primitive synchronization, the simulation
of a Turing-powerful finite automaton with two stacks. A single
finite-control process equipped with a mailbox (required for asyn-
chronous communication) can encode a Turing-powerful queue
automaton in the sense of Minsky. Thus constrained, we opt for
a model of concurrent computation that has finite control, a finite
number of messages, and a finite number of process classes.
Definition 1. An Actor Communicating System (ACS)A is a tuple
〈P,Q,M,R, ι0, q0〉 where P is a finite set of pid-classes, Q is a
finite set of control-states, M is a finite set of messages, ι0 ∈ P is
the pid-class of the initial process, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state of the
initial process, and R is a finite set of rules of the form ι : q ℓ−→ q′
where ι ∈ P , q, q′ ∈ Q and ℓ is a label that can take one of four
possible forms:
- τ , which represents an internal (sequential) transition of a pro-
cess of pid-class ι
- ?m with m ∈ M : a process of pid-class ι extracts (and reads)
a message m from its mailbox
- ι′!m with ι′ ∈ P , m ∈ M : a process of pid-class ι sends a
message m to a process of pid-class ι′
- νι′.q′′ with ι′ ∈ P and q′′ ∈ Q: a process of pid-class ι spawns
a new process of pid-class ι′ that starts executing from q′′
Now we have to give ACS a semantics, but interpreting the ACS
mailboxes as FIFFO queues would yield a Turing-powerful model.
Our solution is to apply a counter abstraction on mailboxes: dis-
regard the ordering of messages, but track the number of occur-
rences of every message in a mailbox. Since we bound the number
of pid-classes, but wish to model dynamic (and hence unbounded)
spawning of processes, we apply a second counter abstraction on
the control states of each pid-class: we count, for each control-state
of each pid-class, the number of processes in that pid-class that are
currently in that state.
It is important to make sure that such an abstraction contains
all the behaviours of the semantics that uses FIFFO mailboxes:
if there is a term in the mailbox that matches a pattern, then the
corresponding branch is non-deterministically fired. To see the
difference, take the ACS that has one process (named ι), three
control states q, q1 and q2, and two rules ι : q ?a−→ q1, ι : q ?b−→ q2.
When equipped with a FIFFO mailbox containing the sequence
c a b, the process can only evolve from q to q1 by consuming a from
the mailbox, since it can skip c but will find a matching message
(and thus not look further into the mailbox) before reaching the
message b. In contrast, the VAS semantics would let q evolve non-
deterministically to both q1 and q2, consuming a or b respectively:
the mailbox is abstracted to [a 7→ 1, b 7→ 1, c 7→ 1] with no
information on whether a or b arrived first. However, the abstracted
semantics does contain the traces of the FIFFO semantics.
The VAS semantics of an ACS is a state transition system
equipped with counters (with values in N) that support increment
and decrement (when non-zero) operations. Such infinite-state sys-
tems are known as vector addition systems (VAS), which are equiv-
alent to Petri nets.
Definition 2 (Vector Addition System). (i) A vector addition sys-
tem (VAS) V is a pair (I,R) where I is a finite set of indices (called
the places of the VAS) and R ⊆ ZI is a finite set of rules. Thus a
rule is just a vector of integers of dimension |I |, whose components
are indexed (i.e. named) by the elements of I .
(ii) The state transition system JVK induced by a VAS V = (I,R)
has state-set NI and transition relation
{(v,v+ r) | v ∈ NI , r ∈ R,v + r ∈ NI}.
We write v ≤ v′ just if for all i in I , v(i) ≤ v′(i).
The semantics of an ACS can now be given easily in terms of a
corresponding underlying vector addition system:
Definition 3 (VAS semantics). The semantics of an ACS A =
(P,Q,M,R, ι0, q0) is the transition system induced by the VAS
V = (I,R) where I = P × (Q⊎M) and R = {r | r ∈ R}). The
transformation r 7→ r is defined as follows. 2
ACS Rules: r VAS Rules: r
ι : q
τ
−→ q′ [(ι, q) 7→ −1, (ι, q′) 7→ 1]
ι : q
?m
−−→ q′ [(ι, q) 7→ −1, (ι, q′) 7→ 1, (ι,m) 7→ −1]
ι : q
ι′!m
−−−→ q′ [(ι, q) 7→ −1, (ι, q′) 7→ 1, (ι′,m) 7→ 1]
ι : q
νι′ . q′′
−−−−→ q′ [(ι, q) 7→ −1, (ι, q′) 7→ 1, (ι′, q′′) 7→ 1]
Given a JVK-state v ∈ NI , the component v(ι, q) counts the
number of processes in the pid-class ι currently in state q, while
the component v(ι,m) is the sum of the number of occurrences of
the message m in the mailboxes of the processes of the pid-class ι.
While infinite-state, many non-trivial properties are decidable
on VAS including reachability, coverability and place boundedness;
for more details see [13]. In this paper we focus on coverability,
which is EXPSPACE-complete [30]: given two states s and t, is it
possible to reach from s a state t′ that covers t (i.e. t′ ≤ t)?
Which kinds of correctness properties of λACTOR programs can
one specify by coverability of an ACS? We will be using ACS to
over-approximate the semantics of a λACTOR program, so if a state
of the ACS is not coverable, then it is not reachable in any execu-
tion of the program. It follows that we can use coverability to ex-
press safety properties such as: (i) unreachability of error program
locations (ii) mutual exclusion (iii) boundedness of mailboxes: is it
possible to reach a state where the mailbox of pid-class ι has more
than k messages? If not we can allocate just k memory cells for
that mailbox.
4. An Operational Semantics for λACTOR
In this section, we define an operational semantics for λACTOR
using a time-stamped CESK* machine, following a methodology
advocated by Van Horn and Might [33]. An unusual feature of
such machines are store-allocated continuations which allow the
recursion in a programs’s control flow and data structure to be
separated from the recursive structure in its state space. As we shall
illustrate in Section 5, such a formalism is key to a transparently
sound and parametric abstract interpretation.
A Concrete Machine Semantics. Without loss of generality, we
assume that in a λACTOR program, variables are distinct, and con-
structors and cases are only applied to (bound) variables. The
2 All unspecified components of the vectors r as defined in the table are set
to zero.
λACTOR machine defines a transition system on (global) states,
which are elements of the set State
s ∈ State := Procs ×Mailboxes × Store
π ∈ Procs := Pid ⇀ ProcState
µ ∈ Mailboxes := Pid ⇀ Mailbox
An element of Procs associates a process with its (local) state, and
an element of Mailboxes associates a process with its mailbox. We
split the Store into two partitions
σ ∈ Store := (VAddr ⇀ Value)× (KAddr ⇀ Kont)
each with its address space, to separate values and continuations.
By abuse of notation σ(x) shall mean the application of the first
component when x ∈ VAddr and of the second when x ∈ KAddr .
The local state of a process
q ∈ ProcState := (ProgLoc ⊎ Pid)× Env ×KAddr × Time
is a tuple, consisting of (i) a pid, or a program location3 which
is a subterm of the program, labelled with its occurrence; when-
ever it is clear from the context, we shall omit the label; (ii) an
environment, which is a map from variables to pointers to values
ρ ∈ Env := Var ⇀ VAddr ; (iii) a pointer to a continuation,
which indicates what to evaluate next when the current evaluation
returns a value; (iv) a time-stamp, which will be described later.
Values are either closures or pids:
d ∈ Value := Closure ⊎ Pid Closure := ProgLoc × Env
Note that, as defined, closures include both functions (which is
standard) as well as constructor terms.
All the domains we define are naturally partially ordered:
ProgLoc and Var are discrete partial orders, all the others are
defined by the appropriate pointwise extensions.
Mailbox and Message Passing A mailbox is just a finite sequence
of values: m ∈ Mailbox := Value∗. We denote the empty mailbox
by ǫ. A mailbox is supported by two operations:
mmatch: pat∗ ×Mailbox × Env × Store →
(N× (Var ⇀ Value)×Mailbox)⊥
enq: Value ×Mailbox → Mailbox
The function mmatch takes a list of patterns, a mailbox, the current
environment and a store (for resolving pointers in the values stored
in the mailbox) and returns the index of the matching pattern, a
substitution witnessing the match, and the mailbox resulting from
the extraction of the matched message. To model Erlang-style
FIFFO mailboxes we set enq(d,m) := m · d and define:
mmatch(p1 . . . pn,m, ρ, σ) := (i, θ,m1 ·m2)
such that
m = m1 · d ·m2 ∀d
′ ∈ m1 .∀j .matchρ,σ(pj , d
′) = ⊥
θ = matchρ,σ(pi, d) ∀j < i .matchρ,σ(pj , d) = ⊥
where matchρ,σ(p, d) seeks to match the term d against the pattern
p, following the pointers ρ to the store σ if necessary, and returning
the witnessing substitution if matchable, and ⊥ otherwise.
Evaluation Contexts as Continuations. Next we represent (in an
inside-out manner) evaluation contexts as continuations. A contin-
uation consists of a tag indicating the shape of the evaluation con-
text, a pointer to a continuation representing the enclosing evalua-
tion context, and, in some cases, a program location and an envi-
ronment. Thus κ ∈ Kont consists of the following constructs:
3 Precisely a program location is a node in the abstract syntax tree of the
program being analysed.
- Stop represents the empty context.
- Argi〈ℓ, v0 . . . vi−1, ρ, a〉 represents the context
E[v0(v1, . . . , vi−1, [ ], e
′
i+1, . . . , e
′
n)]
where e0(e1, . . . , en) is the subterm located at ℓ; ρ closes the terms
ei+1, . . . , en to e′i+1, . . . , e
′
n respectively; the address a points to
the continuation representing the enclosing evaluation context E.
Addresses, Pids and Time-Stamps. While the machine supports
arbitrary concrete representations of time-stamps, addresses and
pids, we present here an instance based on contours [32] which
shall serve as the reference semantics of λACTOR, and the basis for
the abstraction of Section 5.
A way to represent a dynamic occurrence of a symbol is the
history of the computation at the point of its creation. We record
history as contours which are strings of program locations
t ∈ Time := ProgLoc∗
The initial contour is just the empty sequence t0 := ǫ, while
the tick function updates the contour of the process in question
by prepending the current program location, which is always a
function call (see rule Apply):
tick : ProgLoc × Time → Time tick(ℓ, t) := ℓ · t
Addresses for values (b ∈ VAddr ) are represented by tuples
comprising the current pid, the variable in question, the bound
value and the current time stamp. Addresses for continuations
(a, c ∈ KAddr ) are represented by tuples comprising the cur-
rent pid, program location, environment and time (i.e. contour); or
∗ which is the address of the initial continuation (Stop).
VAddr := Pid ×Var ×Data × Time
KAddr := (Pid × ProgLoc × Env ×Time) ⊎ {∗}
The data domain (δ ∈ Data) is the set of closed λACTOR terms; the
function res : Store×Value → Data resolves all the pointers of a
value through the store σ, returning the corresponding closed term:
res(σ, ι) := ι
res(σ, (e, ρ)) := e[x 7→ res(σ, σ(ρ(x))) | x ∈ fv(e)]
New addresses are allocated by extracting the relevant compo-
nents from the context at that point:
newkpush : Pid × ProcState → KAddr
newkpush(ι, 〈ℓ, ρ, , t〉) := (ι, ℓ.arg0, ρ, t)
newkpop : Pid ×Kont × ProcState → KAddr
newkpop(ι, κ, 〈 , , , t〉) := (ι, ℓ.argi+1, ρ, t)
where κ = Argi〈ℓ, . . . , ρ, 〉
newva : Pid × Var ×Data × ProcState → VAddr
newva(ι, x, δ, 〈 , , , t〉) := (ι, x, δ, t)
Remark 2. To enable data abstraction in our framework, the address
of a value contains the data to which the variable is bound: by
making appropriate use of the embedded information in the abstract
semantics, we can fine-tune the data-sensitivity of our analysis, as
we shall illustrate in Section 5. However when no data abstraction
is intended, this data component can safely be discarded.
Following the same scheme, pids (ι ∈ Pid) can be identi-
fied with the contour of the spawn that generated them: Pid :=
(ProgLoc×Time). Thus the generation of a new pid is defined as
newpid : Pid × ProgLoc × Time → Pid
newpid((ℓ
′, t′), ℓ, t) := (ℓ, tick∗(t, tick(ℓ′, t′))
where tick∗ is just the simple extension of tick that prepends a
whole sequence to another. Note that the new pid contains the pid
that created it as a sub-sequence: it is indeed part of its history
(dynamic context). The pid ι0 := (ℓ0, ǫ) is the pid associated with
the starting process, where ℓ0 is just the root of the program.
Remark 3. (i) Note that the only sources of infinity for the state
space are time, mailboxes and the data component of value ad-
dresses. If these domains are finite then the state space is finite and
hence reachability is decidable. (ii) It is possible to present a more
general version of the concrete machine semantics. We can reor-
ganise the machine semantics so that components such as Time,
Pid , Mailbox , KAddr and VAddr are presented as parameters
(which may be instantiated as the situation requires). In this paper
we present a contour-based machine, which is general enough to
illustrate our method of verification.
Definition 4 (Concrete Semantics). Now that the state space is
set up, we define a (non-deterministic) transition relation on states
(→) ⊆ State × State . In Figure 2 we present the rules for
application, message passing and process creation; we omit the
other rules (letrec, case and treatment of pids as returned value)
since they follow the same shape. The transition s → s′ is defined
by a case analysis of the shape of s.
The rules for the purely functional reductions are a simple lift-
ing of the corresponding rules for the sequential CESK* machine:
when the currently selected process is evaluating a variable Vars
its address is looked up in the environment and the corresponding
value is fetched from the store and returned. Apply: When evalu-
ating an application, control is given to each argument—including
the function to be applied—in turn; FunEval and ArgEval are then
applied, collecting the values in the continuation. After all argu-
ments have been evaluated, new values are recorded in the environ-
ment (and the store), and control is given to the body of the func-
tion to be applied. The rule Receive can only fire if mmatch returns
a valid match from the mailbox of the process. In case there is a
match, control is passed to the expression in the matching clause,
and the substitution θ witnessing the match is used to generate the
bindings for the variables of the pattern. When applying a send
Send, the recipient’s pid is first extracted from the continuation, and
enq is then called to dispatch the evaluated message to the desig-
nated mailbox. When applying a spawn Spawn, the argument must
be an evaluated nullary function; a new process with a fresh pid is
then created whose code is the body of the function.
One can easily add rules for run-time errors such as wrong arity
in function application, non-exhaustive patterns in cases, sending
to a non-pid and spawning a non-function.
5. Parametric Abstract Interpretation
We aim to abstract the concrete operational semantics of Section 4
isolating the least set of domains that need to be made finite in order
for the abstraction to be decidable. We then state the conditions on
these abstract domains that are sufficient for soundness.
In Remark 3 we identify Time, Mailbox and Data as responsi-
ble for the unboundedness of the state space. Our abstract semantics
is thus parametric on the abstraction of these basic domains.
Definition 5 (Basic domains abstraction). (i) A data abstraction
is a triple D = 〈D̂ata, αd, r̂es〉 where D̂ata is a flat (i.e. discretely
ordered) domain of abstract data values, αd : Data → D̂ata and
r̂es : Ŝtore × V̂alue → P(D̂ata).
(ii) A time abstraction is a tuple T = 〈T̂ime, αt, t̂ick, t̂0〉 where
T̂ime is a flat domain of abstract contours, αt : Time → T̂ime,
t̂0 ∈ T̂ime, and t̂ick : ProgLoc × T̂ime → T̂ime.
(iii) A mailbox abstraction is a tuple M = 〈M̂ailbox ,≤m,
⊔m, αm, ênq, ǫ̂, m̂match〉 where (M̂ailbox ,≤m,⊔m) is a join-
semilattice with least element ǫ̂ ∈ M̂ailbox , αm : Mailbox →
M̂ailbox and ênq : V̂alue × M̂ailbox → M̂ailbox are monotone
in mailboxes.
m̂match: pat∗ × M̂ailbox × Ênv × Ŝtore →
P(N× (Var ⇀ V̂alue)× M̂ailbox)
(iv) A basic domains abstraction is a triple I = 〈D, T ,M〉
consisting of a data, a time and a mailbox abstraction.
An abstract interpretation of the basic domains determines an
interpretation of the other abstract domains as follows.
Ŝtate := P̂rocs × ̂Mailboxes × Ŝtore
P̂rocs := P̂id → P( ̂ProcState)
̂ProcState := (ProgLoc ⊎ P̂id)× Ênv × K̂Addr × T̂ime
Ŝtore := (V̂Addr → P(V̂alue))× (K̂Addr → P(K̂ont))
̂Mailboxes := P̂id → M̂ailbox V̂alue := Ĉlosure ⊎ P̂id
Ĉlosure := ProgLoc × Ênv Ênv := Var ⇀ V̂Addr
P̂id := (ProgLoc × T̂ime) ⊎ {ι̂0} ι̂0 := t̂0
each equipped with an abstraction function defined by an appropri-
ate pointwise extension. We will call all of them α since it will not
introduce ambiguities. The abstract domain K̂ont is the pointwise
abstraction of Kont , and we will use the same tags as those in the
concrete domain. The abstract functions ̂newkpush, n̂ewkpop, n̂ewva
and n̂ewpid, are defined exactly as their concrete versions, but on
the abstract domains.
When B is a flat domain, the abstraction of a partial map
C = A ⇀ B to Ĉ = Â→ P(B̂) is defined as
αC(f) := λâ ∈ Â. {αB(b) | (a, b) ∈ f and αA(a) = â}
where the preorder on Ĉ is f̂ ≤Ĉ ĝ ⇔ ∀â. f̂(â) ⊆ g(â).
The operations on the parameter domains need to ‘behave’ with
respect to the abstraction functions: the standard correctness condi-
tions listed below must be satisfied by their instances. These con-
ditions amount to requiring that what we get from an application
of a concrete auxiliary function is adequately represented by the
abstract result of the application of the abstract counterpart of that
auxiliary function. The partial orders on the domains are standard
pointwise extensions of partial orders of the parameter domains.
Definition 6 (Sound basic domains abstraction). A basic domains
abstraction I is sound just if the following conditions are met by
the auxiliary operations:
αt(tick(ℓ, t)) ≤ t̂ick(ℓ, αt(t)) (1)
σ̂ ≤ σ̂′ ∧ d̂ ≤ d̂′ =⇒ r̂es(σ̂, d̂) ≤ r̂es(σ̂′, d̂′) (2)
∀σ̂ ≥ α(σ). αd(res(σ, d)) ∈ r̂es(σ̂, α(d)) (3)
αm(enq(d,m)) ≤ ênq(α(d), αm(m)) αm(ǫ) = ǫ̂ (4)
if mmatch(~p,m, ρ, σ) = (i, θ,m′) then ∀m̂ ≥ α(m), ∀σ̂ ≥
α(σ), ∃m̂′ ≥ α(m′) such that
(i, α(θ), m̂′) ∈ m̂match(~p, m̂, α(ρ), σ̂) (5)
Following the Abstract Interpretation framework, one can ex-
ploit the soundness constraints to derive, by algebraic manipula-
tion, the definitions of the abstract auxiliary functions which would
then be correct by construction [24].
Definition 7 (Abstract Semantics). Once the abstract domains
are fixed, the rules that define the abstract transition relation are
Functional reductions
FunEval
if π(ι) = 〈ℓ : (e0(e1, . . . , en)), ρ, a, t〉
b := newkpush(ι, π(ι))
then π′ = π[ι 7→ 〈e0, ρ, b, t〉]
σ′ = σ[b 7→ Arg0〈ℓ, ǫ, ρ, a〉]
ArgEval
if π(ι) = 〈v, ρ, a, t〉
σ(a) = κ = Argi〈ℓ, d0 . . . di−1, ρ′, c〉
di := (v, ρ)
b := newkpop(ι, κ, π(ι))
then π′ = π[ι 7→ 〈ℓ.argi+1, ρ′, b, t〉]
σ′ = σ[b 7→ Argi+1〈ℓ, d0 . . . di, ρ′, c〉]
Apply
if π(ι) = 〈v, ρ, a, t〉, arity(ℓ) = n
σ(a) = κ = Argn〈ℓ, d0 . . . dn−1, ρ′, c〉
d0 = (fun(x1 . . . xn) → e, ρ0) dn := (v, ρ)
bi := newva(ι, xi, res(σ, di), π(ι))
t′ := tick(ℓ, π(ι))
then π′ = π[ι 7→ 〈e, ρ′[x1 → b1 . . . xn → bn], c, t′〉]
σ′ = σ[b1 7→ d1 . . . bn 7→ dn]
Vars
if π(ι) = 〈x, ρ, a, t〉
σ(ρ(x)) = (v, ρ′)
then π′ = π[ι 7→ 〈v, ρ′, a, t〉]
Communication
Receive
if π(ι) = 〈receive p1 → e1 . . . pn → en end, ρ, a, t〉
mmatch(p1 . . . pn, µ(ι), ρ, σ) = (i, θ,m)
θ = [x1 7→ d1 . . . xk 7→ dk ]
bj := newva(ι, xj , res(σ, dj), π(ι))
ρ′ := ρ [x1 7→ b1 . . . xk 7→ bk ]
then π′ = π[ι 7→ 〈ei, ρ′, a, t〉]
µ′ = µ[ι 7→ m]
σ′ = σ[b1 7→ d1 . . . bk 7→ dk ]
Send
if π(ι) = 〈v, ρ, a, t〉
σ(a) = κ = Arg2〈ℓ, d, ι′, , c〉
d = (send, )
then π′ = π[ι 7→ 〈v, ρ, c, t〉]
µ′ = µ[ι′ 7→ enq((v, ρ), µ(ι′))]
Process creation
Spawn
if π(ι) = 〈fun() → e, ρ, a, t〉
σ(a) = Arg1〈ℓ, d, ρ′, c〉
d = (spawn, )
ι′ := newpid(ι, ℓ, ϑ)
then
π′ = π
[
ι 7→ 〈ι′, ρ′, c, t〉,
ι′ 7→ 〈e, ρ, ∗, t0〉
]
µ′ = µ[ι′ 7→ ǫ]
Self
if π(ι) = 〈 self (), ρ, a, t〉
then π′ = π[ι 7→ 〈ι, ρ, a, t〉]
Initial state
Init The initial state associated with
a program P is sP := 〈π0, µ0, σ0〉
where π0 = [ι0 7→ 〈P, [],∗, t0〉]
µ0 = [ι0 7→ ǫ]
σ0 = [∗ 7→ Stop]
Figure 2. Operational Semantics Rules. The tables define the transition relation s = 〈π, µ, σ, ϑ〉 → 〈π′, µ′, σ′, ϑ′〉 = s′ by cases; the
primed components of the state are identical to the non-primed components, unless indicated otherwise in the “then” part of the rule. The
meta-variable v stands for terms that cannot be further rewritten such as λ-abstractions, constructor applications and un-applied primitives.
straightforward abstractions of the original ones. In Figure 3, we
present the abstract counterparts of the rules for the operational
semantics in Figure 2, defining the non-deterministic abstract tran-
sition relation on abstract states ( ) ⊆ Ŝtate × Ŝtate . When
referring to a particular program P , the abstract semantics is the
portion of the graph reachable from sP .
Theorem 1 (Soundness of Analysis). Given a sound abstraction
of the basic domains, if s → s′ and αcfa(s) ≤ u, then there exists
u′ ∈ Ŝtate such that αcfa(s′) ≤ u′ and u u′.
See Appendix B for a proof of the Theorem.
Now that we have defined a sound abstract semantics we give
sufficient conditions for its computability.
Theorem 2 (Decidability of Analysis). If a given (sound) abstrac-
tion of the basic domains is finite, then the derived abstract transi-
tion relation defined in Figure 3 is finite; it is also decidable if the
associated auxiliary operations (in Definition 6) are computable.
Proof. The proof is by a simple inspection of the rules: all the
individual rules are decidable and the state space is finite.
A Simple Mailbox Abstraction Abstract mailboxes need to be
finite too in order for the analysis to be computable. By abstracting
addresses (and data) to a finite set, values, and thus messages,
become finite too. The only unbounded dimension of a mailbox
becomes then the length of the sequence of messages. We then
abstract mailboxes by losing information about the sequence and
collecting all the incoming messages in an un-ordered set:
Mset := 〈P(V̂alue),⊆,∪, αset, ênqset, ∅, m̂matchset〉
where the abstract version of enq is the insertion in the set, as easily
derived from the soundness requirement; the matching function
is similarly derived from the correctness condition: writing ~p =
p1 . . . pn
αset(m) := {α(d) | ∃i. mi = d} ênqset(d̂, m̂) := {d̂} ∪ m̂
m̂matchset(~p, m̂, ρ̂, σ̂) :=
{
(i, θ̂, m̂)
∣∣∣∣∣ d̂ ∈ m̂,θ̂ ∈ m̂atchρ̂,σ̂(pi, d̂)
}
We omit the straightforward proof that this constitutes a sound
abstraction.
Abstracting Data. We included data in the value addresses in the
definition of VAddr , cutting contours would have been sufficient
to make this domain finite. A simple solution is to discard the
value completely by using the trivial data abstraction Data0 :=
{ } which is sound. If more precision is needed, any finite data-
abstraction would do: the analysis would then be able to distinguish
states that differ only because of different bindings in their frame.
We present here a data abstraction particularly well-suited to
languages with algebraic data-types such as λACTOR: the abstraction
⌊e⌋σ̂,D discards every sub-term of e that is nested at a deeper level
than a parameter D.
⌊(e, ρ̂)⌋σ̂,0 := { } ⌊(fun. . ., ρ̂)⌋σ̂,D+1 := { }
⌊(c(x1 . . . xn), ρ̂)⌋σ̂,D+1 :=
{
c(δ̂1 . . . δ̂n)
∣∣∣∣∣ d̂i ∈ σ̂(ρ̂(xi)),δ̂i ∈ ⌊d̂i⌋σ̂,D
}
where is a placeholder for discarded subterms.
An analogous D-deep abstraction can be easily defined for con-
crete values and we use the same notation for both; we use the
notation ⌊δ⌋D for the analogous function on elements of Data .
We define DD = 〈DataD, αD, r̂esD〉 to be the ‘depth-D’ data
abstraction where
DataD+1 := { } ∪ {c(δ̂1 . . . δ̂n) | δ̂i ∈ DataD}
αD(δ) := ⌊δ⌋D r̂esD(σ̂, d̂) := ⌊d̂⌋σ̂,D
The proof of its soundness is easy and we omit it.
Abstracting Time. Let us now define a specific time abstraction
that amounts to a concurrent version of a standard k-CFA. A k-CFA
is an analysis parametric in k, which is able to distinguish dynamic
contexts up to the bound given by k. We proceed as in standard
k-CFA by truncating contours at length k to obtain their abstract
Functional abstract reductions
AbsFunEval
if π̂(ι̂) ∋ q̂ = 〈ℓ : (e0(e1, . . . , en)), ρ̂, â, t̂ 〉
b̂ := ̂newkpush(ι̂, q̂)
then π̂′ = π̂ ⊔ [ι̂ 7→ {〈e0, ρ̂, b̂, t̂ 〉}]
σ̂′ = σ̂ ⊔ [̂b 7→ {Arg0〈ℓ, ǫ, ρ̂, â〉}]
AbsArgEval
if π̂(ι̂) ∋ 〈v, ρ̂, â, t̂ 〉
σ̂(â) ∋ κ̂ = Argi〈ℓ, d̂0 . . . d̂i−1, ρ̂
′, ĉ〉
d̂i := (v, ρ̂)
b̂ := ̂newkpop(ι̂, κ̂, q̂)
then π̂′ = π̂ ⊔ [ι̂ 7→ {〈ℓ.argi+1, ρ̂′, b̂, t̂ 〉}]
σ̂′ = σ̂ ⊔ [̂b 7→ {Argi+1〈ℓ, d̂0 . . . d̂i, ρ̂′, ĉ〉}]
AbsApply
if π̂(ι̂) ∋ q̂ = 〈v, ρ̂, â, t̂ 〉, arity(ℓ) = n
σ̂(â) ∋ Argn〈ℓ, d̂0 . . . d̂n−1, ρ̂′, ĉ〉
d̂0 = (fun(x1 . . . xn) → e, ρ̂0) d̂n := (v, ρ̂)
δ̂i ∈ r̂es(σ̂, d̂i, )
b̂i := n̂ewva(ι̂, xi, δ̂i, q̂ )
ρ̂′′ := ρ̂′[x1 7→ b̂1 . . . xn 7→ b̂n]
then π̂′ = π̂ ⊔ [ι̂ 7→ {〈e, ρ̂′′, ĉ , t̂ick(l, t̂ )〉}]
σ̂′ = σ̂ ⊔ [̂b1 7→ {d̂1} . . . b̂n 7→ {d̂n}]
AbsVars
if π̂(ι̂) ∋ 〈x, ρ̂, â, t̂ 〉
σ̂(ρ̂(x)) ∋ (v, ρ̂′)
then π̂′ = π̂ ⊔ [ι̂ 7→ {〈v, ρ̂′, â, t̂ 〉}]
Abstract communication
AbsReceive
if π̂(ι̂) ∋ q̂ = 〈e, ρ̂, â, t̂ 〉
e = receive p1 → e1 . . . pn → en end
m̂match(p1 . . . pn, µ̂(ι̂), ρ̂, σ̂) ∋ (i, θ̂, m̂)
θ̂ = [x1 7→ d̂1 . . . xk 7→ d̂k]
δ̂j ∈ r̂es(σ̂, d̂j)
b̂j := n̂ewva(ι̂, xj , δ̂j , q̂ )
ρ̂′ := ρ̂[x1 7→ b̂1 . . . xk 7→ b̂k ]
then π̂′ = π̂ ⊔ [ι̂ 7→ {〈ei, ρ̂′, â, t̂ 〉}]
µ̂′ = µ̂[ι̂ 7→ m̂]
σ̂′ = σ̂ ⊔ [̂b1 7→ {d̂1} . . . b̂k 7→ {d̂k}]
AbsSend
if π̂(ι̂) ∋ 〈v, ρ̂, â, t̂ 〉
σ̂(â) ∋ Arg2〈ℓ, d̂, ι̂′, , ĉ〉
d̂ = (send, )
then π̂′ = π̂ ⊔ [ι̂ 7→ {〈v, ρ̂, ĉ, t̂ 〉}]
µ̂′ = µ̂[ι̂′ 7→ ênq((v, ρ̂), µ̂(ι̂′))]
Abstract process creation
AbsSpawn
if π̂(ι̂) ∋ 〈fun() → e, ρ̂, â, t̂ 〉
σ̂(â) ∋ Arg1〈ℓ, d̂, ρ̂′, ĉ〉
d̂ = (spawn, )
ι̂′ := n̂ewpid(ι̂, ℓ, t̂ )
then
π̂′ = π̂ ⊔
[
ι̂ 7→ {〈ι̂′, ρ̂′, ĉ, t̂ 〉},
ι̂′ 7→ {〈e, ρ̂, ∗, t̂0〉}
]
µ̂′ = µ̂ ⊔ [ι̂′ 7→ ǫ̂ ]
AbsSelf
if π̂(ι̂) ∋ 〈 self (), ρ̂, â, t̂ 〉
then π̂′ = π̂ ⊔ [ι̂ 7→ {〈ι̂, ρ̂, â, t̂ 〉}]
Initial abstract state
AbsInit The initial state associated
with a program P is
ŝP := α(sP ) = 〈π̂0, µ̂0, σ̂0〉
where π̂0 = [ι̂0 7→ {〈P, [],∗, t̂0〉}]
µ̂0 = [ι̂0 7→ ǫ̂ ]
σ̂0 = [∗ 7→ {Stop}]
Figure 3. Rules defining the Abstract Semantics. The tables describe the conditions under which a transition ŝ = 〈π̂, µ̂, σ̂〉  〈π̂′, µ̂′,
σ̂′〉 = ŝ′ can fire; the primed versions of the components of the states are identical to the non-primed ones unless indicated otherwise in the
“then” part of the corresponding rule. We write ⊔ for the join operation of the appropriate domain.
counterparts:
Timek :=
⋃
0≤i≤k ProgLoc
i αkt (ℓ1 . . . ℓk · t) := ℓ1 . . . ℓk
The simplest analysis we can then define is the one induced by
the basic domains abstraction 〈Data0,Time0, M̂ailbox set〉. With
this instantiation many of the domains collapse in to singletons.
Implementing the analysis as it is would lead however to an expo-
nential algorithm because it would record separate store and mail-
boxes for each abstract state. To get a better complexity bound, we
apply a widening following the lines of [33, Section 7]: instead
of keeping a separate store and separate mailboxes for each state
we can join them keeping just a global copy of each. This reduces
significantly the space we need to explore: the algorithm becomes
polynomial time in the size of the program (which is reflected in
the size of ProgLoc).
Considering other abstractions for the basic domains easily
leads to exponential algorithms; in particular, the state-space grows
linearly wrt the size of abstract data so the complexity of the anal-
ysis using DataD is exponential in D.
Dealing with open programs. Often it is useful to verify an open
expression where its input is taken from a regular set of terms
(see [28]). We can reproduce this in our setting by introducing a
new primitive choice that non-deterministically calls one of its argu-
ments. For instance, an interesting way of closing N in Example 1
would be by binding it to any num():
letrec . . .
any num() = choice(fun()→ zero,
fun() → {succ, any num()}).
in C = cell start () , add to cell (any num(), C).
Now the uncoverability of the state where more than one instance
of inc is running the protected section would prove that mutual
exclusion is ensured for any number of concurrent copies of inc .
6. Generating the Actor Communicating System
The CFA algorithm we presented allows us to derive a sound ‘flat’
representation of the control-flow of the program. The analysis
takes into account higher-order computation and (limited) informa-
tion about synchronization. Now that we have this rough scheme of
the possible transitions, we can ‘guard’ those transitions with ac-
tions which must take place in their correspondence; these guards,
in the form of ‘receive a message of this form’ or ‘send a message
of this form’ or ‘spawn this process’ cannot be modelled faith-
fully while retaining decidability of useful verification problems,
as noted in Section 3. The best we can do, while remaining sound,
is to relax the synchronization and process creation primitives with
counting abstractions and use the guards to restrict the applicabil-
ity of the transitions. In other words, these guarded (labelled) rules
will form the definition of an ACS that simulates the semantics of
the input λACTOR program.
Terminology. We identify a common pattern of the rules in Figure 3.
In each rule R, the premise distinguishes an abstract pid ι̂ and an
abstract process state q̂ = 〈e, ρ̂, â, t̂〉 associated with ι̂ i.e. q̂ ∈ π̂(ι̂)
and the conclusion of the rule associates a new abstract process
state—call it q̂′—with ι̂ i.e. q̂′ ∈ π̂′(ι̂). Henceforth we shall refer
to (ι̂, q̂, q̂′) as the active components of the rule R.
Definition 8 (Generated ACS). Given a λACTOR program P , a
sound basic domains abstraction I = 〈T ,M,D〉 and a sound data
abstraction for messages Dmsg = 〈M̂sg , αmsg, r̂esmsg〉
the Actor communicating system generated by P , I and Dmsg is
defined as
AP := 〈P̂id , ̂ProcState , M̂sg , R, α(ι0), α(π0(ι0))〉
where sP = 〈π0, µ0, σ0, t0〉 is the initial state (according to Init)
with π0 = [ι0 7→ 〈P , [], ∗, t0〉] and the rules in R are defined by
induction over the following rules.
(i) If ŝ  ŝ′ is proved by rule AbsFunEval or AbsArgEval or
AbsApply with active components (ι̂, q̂, q̂′), then
ι̂ : q̂
τ
−→ q̂′ ∈ R (AcsTau)
(ii) If ŝ  ŝ′ is proved by AbsReceive with active components
(ι̂, q̂, q̂′) where d̂ = (pi, ρ̂′) is the abstract message matched by
m̂match and m̂ ∈ r̂esmsg(σ̂, d̂), then
ι̂ : q̂
?m̂
−−→ q̂′ ∈ R (AcsRec)
(iii) If ŝ  ŝ′ is proved by AbsSend with active components
(ι̂, q̂, q̂′) where d̂ is the abstract value that is sent and m̂ ∈
r̂esmsg(σ̂, d̂), then
ι̂ : q̂
ι̂′!m̂
−−−→ q̂′ ∈ R (AcsSend)
(iv) If ŝ  ŝ′ is proved by AbsSpawn with active component
(ι̂, q̂, q̂′) where ι̂′ is the new abstract pid that is generated in the
premise of the rule, which gets associated with the process state
q̂′′ = 〈e, ρ̂,∗〉 then
ι̂ : q̂
νι̂′.q̂′′
−−−−→ q̂′ ∈ R (AcsSp)
As we will make precise later, keeping P̂id and ̂ProcState
small is of paramount importance for the model checking of the
generated ACS to be feasible. This is the main reason why we keep
the message abstraction independent from the data abstraction: this
allows us to increase precision with respect to types of messages,
which is computationally cheap, and keep the expensive precision
on data as low as possible. It is important to note that these two
‘dimensions’ are in fact independent and a more precise message
space enhances the precision of the ACS even when using Data0
as the data abstraction.
In our examples (and in our implementation) we use a DataD
abstraction for messages where D is the maximum depth of the
receive patterns of the program.
Definition 9. The abstraction function
αacs : State → (P̂id × ( ̂ProcState ⊎ M̂sg)→ N)
relating concrete states and states of the ACS is defined as
αacs(s) :=

(ι̂, q̂) 7→
∣∣{ι | α(ι) = ι̂, α(π(ι)) = q̂}∣∣
(ι̂, m̂) 7→
∣∣∣∣{(ι, i) ∣∣∣∣α(ι) = ι̂,αmsg(res(σ, µ(ι)i)) = m̂
}∣∣∣∣
where s = 〈π, µ, σ〉.
It is important to note that most of the decidable properties
of the generated ACS are not even expressible on the CFA graph
alone: being able to predicate on the contents of the counters means
we can decide boundedness, mutual exclusion and many other
expressive properties. The next example shows one simple way in
which the generated ACS can be more precise than the bare CFA
graph.
Example 2 (Generated ACS). Given the following program:
letrec
server = fun()→ receive {init , P, X}→
send(P, ok), do serve (X)
end.
do serve= fun(X)→ receive
{init , , } → error ;
{set , Y} → do serve (Y);
{get , P} → send(P,X),
do serve (X);
end.
in S = spawn(server), send(S, {init , self () , a}),
receive ok→ send(S, {set , b}) end.
our algorithm would output the following ACS starting from
‘main’: 4
serverι̂s : do serve receive error
?init ι̂0!ok
?set
?init
mainι̂0 :
νι̂s.server ι̂s!init ?ok ι̂s!set
The error state is reachable in the CFA graph but not in its Parikh
semantics: the token init is only sent once and never after ok is
sent back to the main process. Once init has been consumed in the
transition from ‘server’ to ‘do serve’ the counter for it will remain
set to zero forever.
Theorem 3 (Soundness of generated ACS). For all choices of
I and Dmsg, for all concrete states s and s′, if s → s′ and
αacs(s) ≤ v then there exists v′ such that αacs(s′) ≤ v′, and
v →acs v
′
.
See Appendix C for a proof of the Theorem.
Corollary 1 (Simulation). LetAP be the ACS derived from a given
λACTOR program P . We have JAPK simulates the semantics of P:
for each P-run s → s1 → s2 → . . . , there exists a JAPK-run
v →acs v1 →acs v2 →acs . . . such that αacs(s) = v and for all i,
αacs(si) ≤ vi.
Simulation preserves all paths so reachability (and coverability)
is preserved.
Corollary 2. If there is no v ≥ αacs(s′) such that αacs(s) →∗acs v
then s 6→∗ s′.
Example 3 (ACS Generated from Example 1). A (simplified)
pictorial representation of the ACS generated by our procedure
from the program in Example 1 (with the parametric entry point of
Section 5) is shown in Figure 4, using a 0-CFA analysis. The three
pid-classes correspond to the starting process ι̂0 and the two static
calls of spawn in the program, the one for the shared cell process ι̂c
and the other, ι̂i, for all the processes running inc .
The first component of the ACS, the starting one, just spawns
a shared cell and an arbitrary number of concurrent copies of the
third component; these actions increment the counter associated
with states ‘res free’ and ‘inc0’. The second component represents
the intended protocol quite closely; note that by abstracting mes-
sages they essentially become tokens and do not have a payload
anymore. The rules of the third component clearly show its sequen-
tial behaviour. The entry point is (ι̂0, cell start).
The VAS semantics is accurate enough in this case to prove
mutual exclusion of, say, state ‘inc2’, which is protected by locks.
Let’s say for example that n > 0 processes of pid-class ι̂i reached
state ‘inc1’; each of them sent a lock message to the cell; note
that now the message does not contain the pid of the requester
so all these messages are indistinguishable; moreover the order
of arrival is lost, we just count them. Suppose that ι̂c is in state
‘res free’; since the counter for lock is n and hence not zero, the
rule labeled with ?lock is enabled; however, once fired the counter
for ‘res free’ is zero and the rule is disabled. Now exactly one ack
can be sent to the ‘collective’ mailbox of pid-class ι̂i so the rule
receiving the ack is enabled; but as long as it is fired, the only ack
message is consumed and no other ι̂i process can proceed. This
holds until the lock is released and so on. Hence only one process
at a time can be in state ‘inc2’. This property can be stated as a
coverability problem: can inc2 = 2 be covered? Since the VAS
semantics is given in terms of a VAS, the property is decidable
4 Labels are abbreviated to unclutter the picture; for example {init, , }
is abbreviated with init
cell startι̂0 : res start sp inc stop
τ νι̂c.res free
νι̂i.inc0
τ
res freeι̂c :
ack
res locked
Res
cell?lock ι̂i!ack
?req?unlock
τ
ι̂i!ans
τ
inc0ι̂i : inc1
inc2 inc3 inc4
inc5 stop
ι̂c!lock
?ack
ι̂c!req ?ans
ι̂c!req
ι̂c!unlock
Figure 4. ACS generated by the algorithm from Example 1
and the answer can be algorithmically calculated. As we saw the
answer is negative and then, by soundness, we can infer it holds in
the actual semantics of the input program too.
Complexity of the Generation. Generating an ACS from a pro-
gram amounts to calculating the analysis of Section 5 and aggre-
gating the relevant ACS rules for each transition of the analysis.
Since we are adding O(1) rules to R for each transition, the com-
plexity of the generation is the same as the complexity of the anal-
ysis itself. The only reason for adding more than one rule to R
for a single transition is the cardinality of M̂sg but since this costs
only a constant overhead, increasing the precision with respect to
message types is not as expensive as adopting more precise data
abstractions.
Dimension of the Abstract Model. The complexity of coverabil-
ity on VAS is EXPSPACE in the dimension of the VAS; hence for the
approach to be practical, it is critical to keep the number of com-
ponents of the VAS underlying the generated ACS small; in what
follows we call dimension of an ACS the dimension of the VAS
underlying its VAS semantics.
Our algorithm produces an ACS with dimension (| ̂ProcState |+
|M̂sg |)×|P̂id |. With the 0-CFA abstraction described at the end of
Section 5, ̂ProcState is polynomial in the size of the program and
P̂id is linear in the size of the program so, assuming |M̂sg | to be a
constant, the dimension of the generated ACS is polynomial in the
size of the program, in the worst case. Due to the parametricity of
the abstract interpretation we can adjust for the right levels of preci-
sion and speed. For example, if the property at hand is not sensitive
to pids, one can choose a coarser pid abstraction. It is also possible
to greatly reduce ̂ProcState : we observe that many of the control
states result from intermediate functional reductions; such reduc-
1 letrec no a = fun(X)→ case X of a→ error ; b→ ok end.
2 send b = fun(P)→send(P, b), send a(P).
3 send a = fun(P)→send(P, a), send b(P).
4 stutter = fun(F)→receive → unstut(F) end.
5 unstut = fun(F)→receive X→ F(X), stutter (F) end.
6 in P = spawn(fun()→stutter(no a)), send a(P).
Figure 5. A program that Soter cannot verify because of the se-
quencing in mailboxes
tions performed by different processes are independent, thanks to
the actor model paradigm. This allows for the use of preorder re-
ductions. In our prototype, as described in Section 7, we imple-
mented a simple reduction that safely removes states which only
represent internal functional transitions, irrelevant to the property
at hand. This has proven to be a simple yet effective transformation
yielding a significant speedup. We conjecture that, after the reduc-
tion, the cardinality of ̂ProcState is quadratic only in the number
of send, spawn and receive of the program.
7. Evaluation, Limitations and Extensions
Empirical Evaluation. To evaluate the feasibility of the ap-
proach, we have constructed Soter, a prototype implementation
of our method for verifying Erlang programs. Written in Haskell,
Soter takes as input a single Erlang module annotated with safety
properties in the form of simple assertions. Soter supports the full
higher-order fragment and the (single-node) concurrency and com-
munication primitives of Erlang; features not supported by Soter
are described in Remark 1. For more details about the tool see [11].
The annotated Erlang module is first compiled to Core Erlang by
the Erlang compiler. A 0-CFA-like analysis, with support for the
DataD data and message abstraction, is then performed on the
compile; subsequently an ACS is generated. The ACS is simplified
and then fed to the backend model-checker along with coverability
queries translated from the annotations in the input Erlang pro-
gram. Soter’s backend is the tool BFC [18] which features a fast
coverability engine for a variant of VAS. At the end of the verifi-
cation pathway, if the answer is YES then the program is safe with
respect to the input property, otherwise the analysis is inconclusive.
In Table 1 we summarise our experimental results. Many of the
examples are higher-order and use dynamic (and unbounded) pro-
cess creation and non-trivial synchronization. Example 1 appears
as reslock and Soter proves mutual exclusion of the clients’ critical
section. concdb is the example program of [16] for which we prove
mutual exclusion. pipe is inspired by the ‘pipe’ example of [19];
the property proved here is boundedness of mailboxes. sieve is a
dynamically spawning higher-order concurrent implementation of
Erathostene’s sieve inspired by a program by Rob Pike;5 Soter can
prove all the mailboxes are bounded.
All example programs, annotated with coverability queries, can
be viewed and verified using Soter at http://mjolnir.cs.ox.
ac.uk/soter/.
Limitations There are programs and properties that cannot be
proved using any of the presented abstractions. (i) The program
in Figure 5 defines a simple function that discards a message in
the mailbox and feeds the next to its functional argument and so
on in a loop. Another process sends a ‘bad argument’ and a good
one in alternation such that only the good ones are fed to the func-
tion. The property is that the function is never called with a bad
argument. This cannot be proved because sequential information of
the mailboxes, which is essential for the verification, is lost in the
counter abstraction. (ii) The program in Figure 6 defines a high-
er-order combinator that spawns a number of identical workers,
each applied to a different task in a list. It then waits for all the
workers to return a result before collecting them in a list which is
subsequently returned. The desired property is that the combinator
only returns when every worker has sent back its result. Unfortu-
nately to prove this property, stack reasoning is required, which is
beyond the capabilities of an ACS.
Refinement and Extensions. Our parametric definition of the
abstract semantics allows us to tune the precision of the analysis
5 see “Concurrency and message passing in Newsqueak”, http://youtu.
be/hB05UFqOtFA
Example LOC PRP SAFE? ABSTR ACS SIZE TIMED M Places Ratio Analysis Simpl BFC Total
reslock 356 1 yes 0 2 40 10% 0.56 0.08 0.82 1.48
sieve 230 3 yes 0 2 47 19% 0.26 0.03 2.46 2.76
concdb 321 1 yes 0 2 67 12% 1.10 0.16 5.19 6.46
state factory 295 2 yes 0 1 22 4% 0.59 0.13 0.02 0.75
pipe 173 1 yes 0 0 18 8% 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.18
ring 211 1 yes 0 2 36 9% 0.55 0.07 0.25 0.88
parikh 101 1 yes 0 2 42 41% 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.13
unsafe send 49 1 no 0 1 10 38% 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02
safe send 82 1 no* 0 1 33 36% 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06
safe send 82 4 yes 1 2 82 34% 0.23 0.03 0.06 0.32
firewall 236 1 no* 0 2 35 10% 0.36 0.05 0.02 0.44
firewall 236 1 yes 1 3 74 10% 2.38 0.30 0.00 2.69
finite leader 555 1 no* 0 2 56 20% 0.35 0.03 0.01 0.40
finite leader 555 1 yes 1 3 97 23% 0.75 0.07 0.86 1.70
stutter 115 1 no* 0 0 15 19% 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05
howait 187 1 no* 0 2 29 14% 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.22
Table 1. Soter Benchmarks. The number of lines of code refers to the compiled Core Erlang. The PRP column indicates the number of
properties which need to be proved. The columns D and M indicate the data and message abstraction depth respectively. In the “Safe?”
column, “no*” means that the program satisfies the properties but the verification was inconclusive; “no” means that the program is not safe
and Soter finds a genuine counterexample. “Places” is the number of places of the underlying Petri net after the simplification; “Ratio” is the
ratio of the number of places of the generated Petri net before and after the simplification. All times are in seconds.
1 letrec
2 worker= fun(Task)→ . . .
3
4 spawn wait= fun(F, L)→ spawn wait’(F, fun()→[], L).
5 spawn wait’= fun(F, G, L) →
6 case L of
7 [] → G();
8 [ T|Ts]→
9 S = self () ,
10 C = spawn(fun()→
11 send(S, {ans, self () , F(T) })),
12 F’ = fun()→
13 receive
14 {ans, C, R}→ [ R | G() ]
15 end,
16 spawn wait’(F, F’, Ts)
17 end.
18
19 in spawn wait(worker, [ task1, task2, . . . ]) .
Figure 6. A program that Soter cannot verify because of the stack
when the abstraction is too coarse for the property to be proved. For
safety properties, the counter-example witnessing a no-instance is a
finite run of the abstract model. We conjecture that, given a spurious
counter-example, it is possible to compute a suitable refinement
of the basic domains abstraction so that the counter-example is no
longer a run of the corresponding abstract semantics. However a
naı¨ve implementation of the refinement loop would suffer from
state explosion. A feasible CEGAR loop will need to utilise sharper
abstractions: it is possible for example to pinpoint a particular pid
or call or mailbox for which the abstract domains need to be more
precise while coarsely abstracting the rest. The development of a
fully-fledged CEGAR loop is a topic of ongoing research.
The general architecture of our approach, combining static anal-
ysis and abstract model generation, can be adapted to accommodate
different language features and different abstract models. By appro-
priate decoration of the analysis, it is possible to derive even more
complex models for which semi-decision verification procedures
have been developed [4, 21].
8. Related Work
Static Analysis. Verification or bug-finding tools for Erlang [6–
8, 20, 22, 27] typically rely on static analysis. The information
obtained, usually in the form of a call graph, is then used to extract
type constraints or infer runtime properties. Examples of static
analyses of Erlang programs in the literature include data-flow [6],
control-flow [20, 27] and escape [7] analyses.
Van Horn and Might [25] derive a CFA for a multithreaded ex-
tension of Scheme, using the same methodology [33] that we fol-
low. The concurrency model therein is thread-based, and uses a
compare-and-swap primitive. Our contribution, in addition to ex-
tending the methodology to Actor concurrency, is to use the derived
parametric abstract interpretation to bootstrap the construction of
an infinite-state abstract model for automated verification.
Reppy and Xiao [31] and Colby [9] analyse the channel commu-
nication patterns of Concurrent ML (CML). CML is based on typed
channels and synchronous message passing, unlike the Actor-based
concurrency model of Erlang.
Venet [34] proposed an abstract interpretation framework for
the sanalysis of π-calculus, later extended to other process algebras
by Feret [12] and applied to CAP, a process calculus based on the
Actor model, by Garoche [15]. In particular, Feret’s non-standard
semantics can be seen as an alternative to Van Horn and Might’s
methodology, but tailored for process calculi.
Model Checking. Huch [16] uses abstract interpretation and
model checking to verify LTL-definable properties of a restricted
fragment of Erlang programs: (i) order-one (ii) tail-recursive (sub-
sequently relaxed in a follow-up paper [17]), (iii) mailboxes are
bounded (iv) programs spawn a fixed, statically computable, num-
ber of processes. Given a data abstraction function, his method
transforms a program to an abstract, finite-state model; if a path
property can be proved for the abstract model, then it holds for
the input Erlang program. In contrast, our method can verify Er-
lang programs of every finite order, with no restriction on the size
of mailboxes, or the number of processes that may be spawned.
Since our method of verification is by transformation to a decid-
able infinite-state system that simulates the input program, it is
capable of greater accuracy.
McErlang is a model checker for Erlang programs developed by
Fredlund and Svensson [14]. Given a program, a Bu¨chi automaton,
and an abstraction function, McErlang explores on-the-fly a prod-
uct of an abstract model of the program and the Bu¨chi automaton
encoding a property. When the abstracted model is infinite-state,
McErlang’s exploration may not terminate. McErlang implements
a fully-fledged Erlang runtime system, and it supports a substantial
part of the language, including distributed and fault-tolerant fea-
tures.
ACS can be expressed as processes in a suitable variant of
CCS [26]. Decidable fragments of process calculi have been used
in the literature to verify concurrent systems. Meyer [23] isolated
a rich fragment of the π-calculus called depth-bounded. For cer-
tain patterns of communication, this fragment can be the basis of
an abstract model that avoids the “merging” of mailboxes of the
processes belonging to the same pid-class. Erlang programs how-
ever can express processes which are not depth bounded. We plan
to address the automatic abstraction of arbitrary Erlang programs
as depth-bounded process elsewhere.
Bug finding. Dialyzer [7, 8, 20] is a popular bug finding tool, in-
cluded in the standard Erlang / OTP distribution. Given an Erlang
program, the tool uses flow and escape [29] analyses to detect spe-
cific error patterns. Building on top of Dialyzer’s static analysis,
success types are derived. Lindahl and Sagonas’ success types [20]
‘never disallow the use of a function that will not result in a type
clash during runtime’ and thus never generate false positives. Di-
alyzer puts to good use the type annotations that programmers do
use in practice; it scales well and is effective in detecting ‘discrep-
ancies’ in Erlang code. However, success typing cannot be used to
verify program correctness.
Conclusion. We have defined a generic analysis for λACTOR, and
a way of extracting from the analysis a simulating infinite-state ab-
stract model in the form of an ACS, which can be automatically
verified for coverability: if a state of the abstract model is not cov-
erable then the corresponding concrete states of the input λACTOR
program are not reachable. Our constructions are parametric on the
abstractions for Time, Mailbox and Data , thus enabling different
analyses (implementing varying degrees of precision with different
complexity bounds) to be easily instantiated. In particular, with a
0-CFA-like specialisation of the framework, the analysis and gen-
eration of the ACS are computable in polynomial time. Further, the
dimension of the resulting ACS is polynomial in the length of the
input λACTOR program, small enough for the verification problem
to be tractable in many useful cases. The empirical results using
our prototype implementation Soter are encouraging. They demon-
strate that the abstraction framework can be used to prove inter-
esting safety properties of non-trivial programs automatically. We
believe that the proposed technique can easily be adapted to ac-
commodate other languages and other abstract models. The level
of generality at which the algorithm is defined seems to support the
definition of a CEGAR loop readily, the formalisation of which is
a topic for future work.
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A. Abstract Domains, Orders, Abstraction
Functions and Abstract Auxiliary Functions
Abstract Domains, Orders and Abstraction Functions:
P̂id := ProgLoc × T̂ime
≤pid := = × ≤t
αpid := id× αt
V̂Addr := P̂id × Var × D̂ata × T̂ime
≤va := ≤pid × = × ≤d × ≤t
αva := αpid × id× αd × αt
Ênv := Var ⇀ V̂Addr
ρ̂ ≤env ρ̂
′ ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ Var . ρ̂(x) ≤va ρ̂
′(x)
αenv(ρ)(x) := αva(ρ(x))
K̂Addr := P̂id × ProgLoc × Ênv × T̂ime
≤ka := ≤pid × = × ≤env × ≤t
αka := αpid × id× αenv × αt
Ĉlosure := ProgLoc × Ênv
≤cl := = × ≤env
αcl := id × αenv
V̂alue := Ĉlosure ⊎ P̂id
≤val := ≤cl + ≤pid
αval := αcl + αpid
̂ProcState := (ProgLoc ⊎ P̂id)× Ênv × K̂Addr × Time
≤ps := (= + ≤pid)× ≤env × ≤ka × ≤t
αps := (id + αpid )× αenv × αka × αt
P̂rocs := P̂id → P( ̂ProcState)
π̂ ≤proc π̂
′ ⇐⇒ ∀ι̂ ∈ P̂id . π̂(ι̂) ⊆ π̂′(ι̂)
αprocs(π)(ι̂) := {αps(π(ι)) | αpid(ι) = ι̂ }
̂Mailboxes := P̂id → M̂ailbox
µ̂ ≤ms µ̂
′ ⇐⇒ ∀ι̂ ∈ P̂id . µ̂(ι̂) ≤m µ̂
′(ι̂)
αms(µ)(ι̂) :=
⊔
{αm(µ(ι)) | αpid(ι) = ι̂ }
Ŝtore := (V̂Addr → P(V̂alue))× (K̂Addr → P(K̂ont))
σ̂ ≤st σ̂
′ ⇐⇒ ∀b̂ ∈ V̂Addr . σ̂(̂b) ⊆ σ̂′(̂b)
∀â ∈ K̂Addr . σ̂(â) ⊆ σ̂′(â)
αst(σ)(̂b) := {αval(σ(b)) | αva(b) = b̂ }, b̂ ∈ V̂Addr
αst(σ)(â) := {αkont(σ(a)) | αka(a) = â }, â∈ K̂Addr
Ŝtate := P̂rocs × ̂Mailboxes × Ŝtore
≤ :=≤procs × ≤ms × ≤st
αcfa := (id + αpid )× αenv
where we write f + g := {(x, x′) | (x, x′) ∈ f or (x, x′) ∈ g}.
Abstract Auxiliary Functions:
̂newkpush : P̂id × ̂ProcState → K̂Addr
̂newkpush(ι̂, (ℓ, ρ̂, , t̂ )) := (ι̂, ℓ.arg0, ρ̂, t̂ )
n̂ewkpop : P̂id × K̂ont × ̂ProcState → K̂Addr
n̂ewkpop(ι̂, κ̂, 〈 , , , t̂ 〉) := (ι̂, ℓ.argi+1, ρ̂, t̂ )
where κ = Argi〈ℓ, . . . , ρ̂, 〉
n̂ewva : P̂id × Var × D̂ata × ̂ProcState → V̂Addr
n̂ewva(ι̂, x, δ̂, 〈 , , , t̂ 〉) := (ι̂, x, δ̂, t̂ )
n̂ewpid : P̂id × ProgLoc × T̂ime → P̂id
n̂ewpid((ℓ
′, t̂′), ℓ, t̂ ) := (ℓ, t̂ick
∗
( t̂, t̂ick(ℓ′, t̂′))
Concrete and Abstract Match Function:
matchρ,σ(pi, (x, ρ
′)) = matchρ,σ(pi, σ(ρ
′(x)))
matchρ,σ(x, d) = {x 7→ d} if x /∈ dom(ρ)
matchρ,σ(x, d) = {x 7→ d} if matchρ′,σ(p′, d) 6= ⊥
where (p′, ρ′) = σ(ρ(x))
matchρ,σ(p, (t, ρ
′)) =
⊗
1≤i≤n
matchρ,σ(pi, (ti, ρ
′))
where p = c(p1, . . . , pn)
t = c(t1, . . . , tn)
θ ⊗ θ′ = ⊥ if ∃x . θ(x) 6= θ′(x)
θ ⊗ θ′ = θ ∪ θ′ otherwise⊗
∅
= []
matchρ,σ(p, d) = ⊥ otherwise
m̂atchρ̂,σ̂(pi, (x, ρ̂
′)) =
⋃
d̂∈σ̂(ρ̂′(x))
m̂atchρ̂,σ̂(pi, d̂ )
m̂atchρ̂,σ̂(x, d) = {x 7→ d̂ }
m̂atchρ̂,σ̂(p, (t, ρ̂
′)) =
⊗̂
1≤i≤n
m̂atchρ̂,σ̂(pi, (ti, ρ̂
′))
if p = c(p1, . . . , pn) and
t = c(t1, . . . , tn)
where
⊗̂
({Θi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n})=
θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
θ =
⊗
1≤i≤n
θi, θ 6= ⊥,
θi ∈ Θi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n

m̂atchρ̂,σ̂(p, d) = ∅ otherwise
Lemma 1. Suppose the concrete domain C = A ⇀ B of partial
functions has abstract domain Ĉ = Â → P(B̂) with the induced
order ≤ and abstraction function αC : C → Ĉ as specified in 5
then for all f ∈ C and for all αC(f) ≤ f̂
∀a ∈ dom(f) . αB(f(a)) ∈ f̂(αA(a)). (6)
Further suppose f, f ′ ∈ C such that f ′ = f [a1 7→ b1, . . . , an 7→
bn] and let f̂ , f̂ ′ ∈ Ĉ such that f̂ ′ = f̂ ⊔ [â1 7→ b̂1, . . . , ân 7→ b̂n]
with αC(f) ≤ f̂ and αA(ai) = âi, αB(bi) = b̂i for i = 1, . . . , n
then
αC(f
′) ≤ f̂ ′. (7)
Proof. Let f ∈ C and f̂ ∈ Ĉ such that αC(f) ≤ f̂ . The definition
of ≤ implies that for all â ∈ Â
αC(f)(â) ⊆ f̂(â).
Take a ∈ A and fix â = αA(a) then we obtain
αC(f)(αA(a)) ⊆ f̂(αA(a)).
Expanding the definition of αC yields
{αB(b0) | (a0, b0) ∈ f, αA(a0) = αA(a))} ⊆ f̂(αA(a)).
In particular αB(f(a)) ∈ {αB(b0) | (a0, b0) ∈ f, αA(a0) =
αA(a))} which yields what we set out to prove
∀a ∈ dom(f) . αB(f(a)) ∈ f̂(αA(a)).
Turning to equation 7 we want to show αC(f ′) ≤ f̂ ′. Let â ∈ Â
then there are several cases to consider
(i) αC(f ′)(â) = αC(f)(â). Then since αC(f) ≤ f̂ ≤ f̂ ′ we have
αC(f)(â) ⊆ f̂(â) ⊆ f̂
′(â).
(ii) â = αA(ai) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then â = âi and thus
αC(f
′)(â) = {αB(bi)} ∪ {αB(f(a))|αA(a) = â, a 6= ai}
⊆ {b̂i} ∪ αC(f)(â)
⊆ {b̂i} ∪ f̂(â) ⊆ f̂
′(â)
(iii) otherwise there does not exist (a, b) ∈ f ′ such that αA(a) = â
and hence αC(f ′)(a) = ∅ which makes our claim trivially true.
We can thus conclude that αC(f ′) ≤ f̂ ′.
Corollary 3. Let π ∈ Procs and π̂ ∈ P̂rocs such that αproc(π) ≤
π̂, let σ ∈ Store and σ̂ ∈ Ŝtore such that αst(σ) ≤ σ̂ and Let
µ ∈ Mailboxes and µ̂ ∈ ̂Mailboxes such that αms(µ) ≤ µ̂ then
(i) ∀ι ∈ Pid . αps(π(ι)) ∈ π̂(αpid(ι))
(ii) ∀b ∈ VAddr . αval(σ(b)) ∈ σ̂(αva(b))
(iii) ∀a ∈ KAddr . αkont(σ(a)) ∈ σ̂(αka(a))
(iv) ∀ι ∈ Pid . αm(µ(ι)) ≤ µ̂(αpid(ι))
(v) ∀ι ∈ Pid .∀x ∈ Var .∀δ ∈ Data .∀q ∈ ProcState .
αva(newva(ι, x, δ, q)) = n̂ewva(αpid(ι), x, αd(δ), αps(q))
Proof. Cases (i) - (iii) follow directly from Lemma 1; it remains to
show the claims of (iv) and (v).
(iv) By assumption αms(µ) ≤ µ̂ which implies that
αms(µ)(αpid(ι)) ≤ µ̂(αpid(ι)) = µ̂(ι̂).
Expanding αms then gives us that αm(µ(ι)) ≤ αms(µ)(αpid(ι)),
since αms(µ) = λι̂.
⊔
{αm(µ(ι)) | αpid(ι) = ι̂}, which allows us
to conclude
αm(µ(ι)) ≤ µ̂(ι̂).
(v) The claim follows straightforwardly from expanding newva and
n̂ewva:
αva(newva(ι, x, δ, q)) = (αpid(ι), x, αd(δ), αt(t))
n̂ewva(αpid(ι), x, αd(δ), αps(q))
where q = 〈e, ρ, a, t〉.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by a case analysis of the rule that
defines the concrete transition s→ s′. For each rule, the transition
in the concrete system can be replicated in the abstract transition
system using the abstract version of the rule, with the appropriate
choice of abstract pid, the continuation from the abstract store, the
message from the abstract mailbox, etc.
Let s = 〈π, µ, σ〉 → 〈π′, µ′, σ′〉 = s′ and u = 〈π̂, µ̂, σ̂〉 such
that αproc(π) ≤ π̂, αmail(µ) ≤ µ̂, and αst(σ) ≤ σ̂. We consider a
number of rules for illustration.
Case: (Send). We know that s → s′ using rule Send; we can thus
assume
π(ι) = 〈v, ρ, a, t〉
σ(a) = Arg2〈ℓ, d, ι
′, , c〉
d = (send, )
and for s′
π′ = π[ι 7→ 〈v, ρ, c, t〉]
µ′ = µ[ι′ 7→ enq((v, ρ), µ(ι′))]
σ′ = σ.
As a first step we will examine u and show that u  u′ for some
u′. For π̂ and σ̂, writing ι̂ := αpid(ι), Corollary 3 gives us
〈v, ρ̂, â, t̂ 〉 ∈ π̂(ι̂)
Arg2〈ℓ, d̂, ι̂
′, , ĉ〉 ∈ σ̂(â)
where αenv(ρ) = ρ̂, αak(a) = â, d̂ = αval(d), t̂ = αt(t),
ι̂′ = αpid(ι
′) and ĉ = αka(c). Rule AbsSend is now applicable
and we can set
π̂′ := π̂ ⊔ [̂ι 7→ q̂]
q̂ := 〈v, ρ̂, ĉ, t̂ 〉
µ̂′ := µ̂[̂ι′ 7→ ênq((v, ρ̂), µ̂(ι̂′))]
u′ := 〈π̂′, µ̂′, σ̂〉.
It follows from rule (AbsSend) that u  u′. It remains to show
that αcfa(s′) ≤ u′ which follows directly from (i) αproc(π′) ≤ π̂′
and (ii) αms(µ′) ≤ µ̂′.
(i) αproc(π′) ≤ π̂′ follows immediately from Lemma 1 since
ι̂ = αpid(ι) and αps(q) = q̂.
(ii) αms(µ′) ≤ µ̂′. It is sufficient to show that αpid(ι′) = ι̂′, which
is immediate, and αm(µ′(ι′)) ≤ µ̂(ι̂). For the latter, since
αenv(ρ) = ρ̂, a sound basic domain abstraction gives us
αm(µ
′(ι′)) = αm(enq((v, ρ), µ(ι
′)))
≤ ênq((v, ρ̂), µ̂(ι̂′)) = µ̂(ι̂)
provided we can show αm(µ(ι′)) ≤ µ̂(ι̂′); the latter inequality
follows Corollary 3. Hence we can conclude αms(µ′) ≤ µ̂′
which completes the proof of this case.
Case: (Receive). In the concrete s→ s′ using the Receive, hence we
can make the following assumptions
π(ι) = 〈receive p1 → e1 . . . pn → en end, ρ, a, t〉 =: q
(i, θ,m) = mmatch(p1 . . . pn, µ(ι), ρ, σ)
θ = [x1 7→ d1 . . . xk 7→ dk]
bj = newva(ι, xj , δj , q)
δj = res(σ, dj)
and for state s′
π′ = π[ι 7→ q′]
q′ = 〈ei, ρ
′, a, t〉
ρ′ = ρ[x1 7→ b1 . . . xk 7→ bk]
µ′ = µ[ι 7→ m]
σ′ = σ[b1 7→ d1 . . . bk 7→ dk].
As a first step we will look at u to prove there there exists a u′
such that u  u′ using rule AbsReceive. We can invoke Corollary
3, since αproc(π) ≤ π̂, to obtain
q̂ := 〈receive p1 → e1 . . . pn → en end, ρ̂, â, t̂ 〉 ∈ π̂(ι̂)
where we write ρ̂ := αenv(ρ), â := αka(a), t̂ = αt(t) and
ι̂ := αpid(ι). Moreover Corollary 3 gives us
αm(µ(ι)) ≤ µ̂(ι̂).
as αms(µ) ≤ µ̂ and ι̂ = αpid(ι). Since the instantiation of the basic
domains is sound and αst(σ) ≤ σ̂ we then know that
(i, θ̂, m̂) ∈ m̂match(~p, µ̂(ι̂), ρ̂, σ̂)
such that θ̂ = αsub(θ) and m̂ ≥ αm(m). Turning to the substitution
θ̂ we can see that
θ̂ = [x1 7→ d̂1 . . . xk 7→ d̂k]
where d̂i = α(di) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Appealing to the sound basic
domain instantiation once more, noting that αst(σ) ≤ σ̂, yields
that for j = 1, . . . , k we have δ̂j := αd(δj) ∈ res(σ̂, d̂j);
to obtain new abstract variable addresses we can now set b̂j :=
n̂ewva(ι̂, xj , δ̂j , q̂ ). Rule AbsReceive is applicable now; we make
the following definitions
π̂′ := π̂ ⊔ [̂ι 7→ q̂′]
q̂′ := 〈ei, ρ̂
′, â, t̂ 〉
ρ̂′ := ρ̂[x1 7→ b̂1 . . . xk 7→ b̂k]
µ̂′ := µ̂[̂ι 7→ m̂]
σ̂′ := σ̂ ⊔ [̂b1 7→ d̂1 . . . b̂k 7→ d̂k]
û′ := 〈π̂′, µ̂′, σ̂′, ϑ̂〉
and observe that u  u′. It remains to show αcfa(s′) ≤ u′ which
follows directly if we can prove (i)αproc(π′) ≤ π̂′, (ii)αms(µ′) ≤ µ̂′
and (iii) αst(σ′) ≤ σ̂′.
(i) αproc(π′) ≤ π̂′. We note that by Corollary 3 we know b̂i =
αva(bi) as ι̂ = αpid(ι), δ̂i = αd(δi) and αproc(q) = q̂ for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. It follows that ρ̂′ = αenv(ρ′) and hence q̂′ =
αps(q
′). Lemma 1 is now applicable, since ι̂ = αpid(ι), to give
αproc(π
′) ≤ π̂′.
(ii) αms(µ′) ≤ µ̂′. It is sufficient to show that ι̂ = αpid(ι), which is
immediate, and αm(m) ≤ m̂ which we have already established
above; hence we can conclude αms(µ′) ≤ µ̂′.
(iii) αst(σ′) ≤ σ̂′. The observation that b̂i = αva(bi) and d̂i =
αval(di) allows the application of Lemma 1 which gives αst(σ′) ≤
σ̂′ as desired.
This completes the proof of this case.
Case: (Apply). Since s→ s′ using rule Apply we can assume that
π(ι) = 〈v, ρ, a, t〉 =: q
σ(a) = Argn〈ℓ, d0 . . . dn−1, ρ
′, c〉 := κ
arity(ℓ) = n
d0 = (fun(x1 . . . xn) → e, ρ0)
dn = (v, ρ)
and for i = 1, . . . , n
δi = res(σ, di)
bi = newva(ι, xi, δi, q)
additionally for the successor state s′
π′ = π[ι 7→ q′]
where q′ := 〈e, ρ′[x1 → b1 . . . xn → bn], c, tick(ℓ, t)〉
σ′ = σ[b1 7→ d1 . . . bn 7→ dn]
µ′ = µ
As a first step we will examine u and show that there exists a u′
such that u  u′ using rule AbsApply. From Corollary 3, since
αproc(π) ≤ π̂, it follows that
q̂ := 〈v, αenv(ρ), αka(a), αt(t)〉 ∈ π̂(αpid(ι)).
Letting ρ̂ := αenv(ρ), â := αka(a), t̂ := αt(t) and ι̂ := αpid(ι) we
can appeal to Corollary 3 again, as αst(σ) ≤ σ̂, to obtain
Argn〈ℓ, d̂0 . . . d̂n−1, ρ̂
′, ĉ〉 ∈ σ̂(â)
where we write d̂i := αval(di) for 0 ≤ i < n, ρ̂′ := αenv(ρ′) and
ĉ := αka(c). Expanding αval yields
d̂0 = (fun(x1 . . . xn) → e, ρ̂0)
where we write ρ̂0 := αenv(ρ0). Taking d̂n := (v, ρ̂) we obtain
from our sound basic domain abstraction
δ̂i := αd(δi) ∈ r̂es(σ̂, d̂i) for i = 1, . . . , n
as αst(σ) ≤ σ̂ and d̂i = αval(di). Turning to the abstract variable
addresses we define
b̂i := n̂ewva(ι̂, xi, δ̂i, q̂ ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Rule AbsApply is now applicable and we define
π̂′ := π̂ ⊔ [̂ι 7→ q̂′]
q̂′ := 〈e, ρ̂′[x1 → b̂1 . . . xn → b̂n], ĉ, t̂ick(ℓ, t̂ )〉
σ̂′ := σ̂ ⊔ [ b̂1 7→ d̂1 . . . b̂n 7→ d̂n]
u′ := 〈π̂′, µ̂, σ̂′〉.
It is clear from rule AbsApply that u  u′; it remains to show that
αcfa(s
′) ≤ u′ to prove this case. The latter follows if we can justify
(i) αproc(π′) ≤ π̂′ and (ii) αst(σ′) ≤ σ̂′.
(i) αproc(π′) ≤ π̂′. We can appeal to Lemma 1 provided we can
show that ι̂ = αpid(ι) and αps(q′) = q̂′ where the former
is immediate. For the latter, first observe that since we have
a sound basic domain abstraction we know αt(tick(ℓ, t)) ≤
t̂ick(ℓ, t̂ ); however as Time is a flat domain so the above
inequality is in fact an equality
αt(tick(ℓ, t)) = t̂ick(ℓ, t̂ ).
Moreover b̂i = αva(bi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n by Corollary 3, hence
αenv(ρ
′[x1 → b1 . . . xn → bn]) = ρ̂
′[x1 → b̂1 . . . xn → b̂n]
as αenv(ρ
′) = ρ̂′; in combination with ĉ = αka(c) we obtain the
desired αps(q′) = q̂′. Thus we conclude that αproc(π′) ≤ π̂′.
(ii) αst(σ′) ≤ σ̂′. Since αva(bi) = b̂i and αval(di) = d̂i for
1 ≤ i ≤ n Lemma 1 is applicable once more and gives us
αst(σ
′) ≤ σ̂′ and completes the proof of this case.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Terminology. Analogously to our remark in section 6 on active
components for rules AbsR in the abstract operational semantics it
is possible to identify a similar pattern in the concrete operational
semantics. Henceforth we will speak of the concrete active compo-
nent (ι, q, q′) of a rule R of the concrete operational semantics and
we will say the abstract active component (ι̂, q̂, q̂′) of a rule AbsR
of the abstract operational semantics where AbsR is the abstract
counterpart of R. We will omit the adjectives abstract and concrete
when there is no confusion.
Lemma 2. Suppose s→ s′ using the concrete rule R with concrete
active component (ι, q, q′) and ŝ ≥ αcfa(s). Then ŝ  ŝ′ with
ŝ′ ≥ αcfa(s′) using rule AbsR with abstract active component
(αpid(ι), αps(q), αps(q
′)).
Proof. The claim follows from inspection of the proof of Theo-
rem 1.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose s → s′ using rule R of the concrete
operational semantics with active component (ι, q, q′). We will
prove our claim by case analysis on R.
- R = FunEval, ArgEval, Apply or Vars. Take ŝ = αcfa(s);
Lemma 2 gives us that ŝ  ŝ′ using abstract rule AbsR =
AbsFunEval, AbsArgEval, AbsApply or Vars respectively with
active component (ι̂, q̂, q̂′) where ι̂ = αpid(ι), q̂ = αps(q) and
q̂′ = αps(q
′). It follows that
r := ι̂ : q̂
τ
−→ q̂′ ∈ R.
Since s→ s′ with active component (ι, q, q′) it follows that
(i) αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂) ≥ 1,
(ii) αacs(s′)(ι̂, q̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂)− 1 and
(iii) αacs(s′)(ι̂, q̂′) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂′) + 1
as ι̂ = αpid(ι), q̂ = αps(q) and q̂′ = αps(q′). We know
αacs(s) ≤ v and thus
v(ι̂, q̂) ≥ 1.
If we define
v
′ := v[(ι̂, q̂) 7→ v(ι̂, q̂)− 1, (ι̂, q̂′) 7→ v(ι̂, q̂′) + 1],
then it is clear that v →acs v′ using rule r ∈ R and the
inequalities
αacs(s
′)(ι̂, q̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂)− 1 ≤ v(ι̂, q̂)− 1 = v
′(ι̂, q̂)
αacs(s
′)(ι̂, q̂′) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂
′) + 1 ≤ v(ι̂, q̂′) + 1 = v′(ι̂, q̂′);
the consequence of the latter two is that αacs(s′) ≤ v′, since
αacs(s) ≤ v, which completes the proof of this case.
- R = Receive. Letting ŝ = αcfa(s) Lemma 2 yields that ŝ  ŝ′
using abstract rule AbsReceive with active component (ι̂, q̂, q̂′)
where ι̂ = αpid(ι), q̂ = αps(q) and q̂′ = αps(q′). We note that
s = 〈π, σ, µ〉 and ŝ = 〈π̂, σ̂, µ̂〉 where π̂ = αproc(π), σ̂ =
αst(σ) and µ̂ = αms(µ). Let the message matched by mmatch
and extracted from µ(ι) be d = (pi, ρ′) then inspecting rule
AbsReceive we can assume that during ŝ  ŝ′ message d̂ =
(pi, ρ̂
′), where ρ̂′ = αenv(ρ′), is matched by m̂match. Since
the message abstraction is a sound data abstraction we know
that
m̂ := αmsg(res(σ, d)) ∈ r̂esmsg(σ̂, d̂ )
and hence we have
r := ι̂ : q̂
?m̂
−−→ q̂′ ∈ R
Additionally we know
(i) αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂) ≥ 1,
(ii) αacs(s)(ι̂, m̂) ≥ 1,
(iii) αacs(s′)(ι̂, q̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂)− 1,
(iv) αacs(s′)(ι̂, q̂′) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂′) + 1 and
(v) αacs(s′)(ι̂, m̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂, m̂)− 1
since d is the message extracted from µ(ι) and m̂ = αmsg(res(σ, d)).
By assumption we know αacs(s) ≤ v which implies
v(ι̂, q̂) ≥ 1 and v(ι̂, m̂) ≥ 1
and so we can define
v
′ := v
 (ι̂, q̂) 7→ v(ι̂, q̂ )− 1,(ι̂, m̂) 7→ v(ι̂, m̂)− 1,
(ι̂, q̂′) 7→ v(ι̂, q̂′) + 1
 ;
it is then clear that, using rule r ∈ R, v →acs v′ and
αacs(s
′)(ι̂, q̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂)− 1 ≤ v(ι̂, q̂)− 1 = v
′(ι̂, q̂)
αacs(s
′)(ι̂, m̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂, m̂)− 1 ≤ v(ι̂, m̂)− 1 = v
′(ι̂, m̂)
αacs(s
′)(ι̂, q̂′) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂
′) + 1 ≤ v(ι̂, q̂′) + 1 = v′(ι̂, q̂′).
Hence, since αacs(s) ≤ v, we can conclude αacs(s′) ≤ v′ as
desired.
- R = Send. Using Lemma 2, with ŝ = αcfa(s), gives ŝ ŝ′ with
active component (ι̂, q̂, q̂′) for the abstract rule AbsSend where
ι̂ = αpid(ι), q̂ = αps(q) and q̂′ = αps(q′). Examining the
concrete and abstract states we see s = 〈π, σ, µ〉 and ŝ = 〈π̂,
σ̂, µ̂〉where π̂ = αproc(π), σ̂ = αst(σ) and µ̂ = αms(µ). Let the
pid of the recipient be ι′ and let d be the value enqueued to ι′’s
mailbox µ(ι′); inspecting the proof of Theorem 1 the pid of the
abstract recipient is ι̂′ := αpid(ι′) and the sent abstract value
is d̂ = αval(d). Appealing to the soundness of the message
abstraction we obtain
m̂ := αmsg(res(σ, d)) ∈ r̂esmsg(σ̂, d̂ )
and hence we have
r := ι̂ : q̂
ι̂′!m̂
−−−→ q̂′ ∈ R
Additionally we know
(i) αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂) ≥ 1,
(ii) αacs(s′)(ι̂, q̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂)− 1,
(iii) αacs(s′)(ι̂, q̂′) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂′) + 1 and
(iv) αacs(s′)(ι̂′, m̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂′, m̂) + 1
since d is the message enqueued toµ(ι′) and m̂ = αmsg(res(σ, d)).
From our assumption we know αacs(s) ≤ v and thus
v(ι̂, q̂) ≥ 1;
making the definition
v
′ := v
 (ι̂, q̂) 7→ v(ι̂, q̂ )− 1,(ι̂, q̂′) 7→ v(ι̂, q̂′) + 1,
(ι̂′, m̂) 7→ v(ι̂′, m̂) + 1
 ;
we observe that we are able to use rule r ∈ R to make the step
v →acs v
′
. Further the inequalities
αacs(s
′)(ι̂, q̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂)− 1 ≤ v(ι̂, q̂)− 1 = v
′(ι̂, q̂)
αacs(s
′)(ι̂, q̂′) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂
′) + 1 ≤ v(ι̂, q̂′) + 1 = v′(ι̂, q̂′)
αacs(s
′)(ι̂′, m̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂
′, m̂)− 1 ≤ v(ι̂′, m̂)− 1 = v′(ι̂′, m̂).
imply, since αacs(s) ≤ v, that αacs(s′) ≤ v′ which concludes
the proof of this case.
- R = Spawn. Take ŝ = αcfa(s); Lemma 2 gives us that ŝ  ŝ′
using abstract rule AbsSpawn with active component (ι̂, q̂, q̂′)
where ι̂ = αpid(ι), q̂ = αps(q) and q̂′ = αps(q′). We note
that s = 〈π, σ, µ〉, s′ = 〈π′, σ′, µ′〉 and ŝ = 〈π̂, σ̂, µ̂〉 where
π̂ = αproc(π), σ̂ = αst(σ) and µ̂ = αms(µ). Further we can
assume
π(ι) = 〈fun() → e, ρ, a, t〉
σ(a) = Arg1〈ℓ, d, ρ
′, c〉
d = (spawn, )
ι′ := newpid(ι, ℓ, ϑ)
π′(ι) = 〈ι′, ρ′, c, t〉 = q′
π′(ι′) = 〈e, ρ,∗, t0〉 =: q
′′
Noting that we are replicating the step s → s′ in the abstract
ŝ ŝ′, αcfa(s) = ŝ and αpid ◦ newpid = n̂ewpid ◦α we can see
that the new abstract pid created is ι̂′ = αpid(ι′) together with
its process state q̂′′ = αps(q′′). Hence we can conclude that
r := ι̂ : q̂
νι̂′.q̂′′
−−−−→ q̂′ ∈ R
and we observe that
(i) αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂) ≥ 1,
(ii) αacs(s′)(ι̂, q̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂)− 1,
(iii) αacs(s′)(ι̂, q̂′) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂′) + 1 and
(iv) αacs(s′)(ι̂′, q̂′′) = αacs(s)(ι̂′, q̂′′) + 1.
Now the assumption αacs(s) ≤ v allows us to conclude
v(ι̂, q̂) ≥ 1;
so that we can define
v
′ := v
 (ι̂, q̂) 7→ v(ι̂, q̂ )− 1,(ι̂, q̂′) 7→ v(ι̂, q̂′) + 1,
(ι̂′, q̂′′) 7→ v(ι̂′, q̂′′) + 1
 ;
and use rule r ∈ R to make the step v →acs v′. Further with
the inequalities
αacs(s
′)(ι̂, q̂) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂)− 1 ≤ v(ι̂, q̂)− 1 = v
′(ι̂, q̂)
αacs(s
′)(ι̂, q̂′) = αacs(s)(ι̂, q̂
′) + 1 ≤ v(ι̂, q̂′) + 1 = v′(ι̂, q̂′)
αacs(s
′)(ι̂′, q̂′′) = αacs(s)(ι̂
′, q̂′′)− 1 ≤ v(ι̂′, q̂′′)− 1 = v′(ι̂′, q̂′′).
and our assumption αacs(s) ≤ v we see that αacs(s′) ≤ v′
which completes the proof of this case and the theorem.
